

# CURRENT HISTORY

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November, 1983

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# Current History

OCTOBER, 1983

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*Yuri Andropov's consolidation of power, the inherent problems of the economy, and Soviet foreign policy, especially Soviet-American relations, are discussed in this issue. Our lead article points out that, "given the present low point in Soviet-American relations, perhaps there is limited consolation in the pendulum swings of the past. Over the years, major changes have often come about with dramatic suddenness, and frequently the fears provoked by a sharp deterioration of relations have served as an impetus to new efforts to lessen the danger of war."*

## Soviet-American Relations: The Uncertain Future

BY PAUL MARANTZ

*Associate Professor of Political Science, University of British Columbia*

**D**URING the past two decades, Soviet-American relations have come full circle. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 brought the world closer than ever before to the brink of a nuclear catastrophe. This was followed by the détente of the early 1970's, the most significant warming of Soviet-American relations since World War II. In turn, this period has been superseded by a new plunge into cold war hostility and suspicion.

Even more disappointing is the regularity with which this oscillating pattern of temporary cordiality and sharp confrontation has been repeated. In each and every decade since the establishment of the Soviet regime, improved East-West relations have at one point seemed tantalizingly close, only to slip away. Moscow's relations with the outside world first warmed in the 1920's when the Soviet regime was experimenting with economic reform. This was followed by additional short-lived thaws in the mid-1930's (as part of the united front against fascism), in the early 1940's (during the World War II alliance against Germany), in 1953-1956 (as a consequence of post-Stalin liberalization), and in 1963-1964 (as exemplified by the treaty banning the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons).

<sup>1</sup>Among the most useful analyses of recent Soviet-American relations are: Seweryn Bialer and Joan Afferica, "Reagan and Russia," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 61, no. 2 (winter, 1982-1983), pp. 249-271; Robert Legvold, "Containment Without Confrontation," *Foreign Policy*, no. 40 (fall, 1980), pp. 74-98; Dimitri Simes, "The Death of Detente?" *International Security*, vol. 5, no. 1 (summer, 1980), pp. 3-25; Adam B. Ulam, *Dangerous Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).

What is it about East-West relations that has produced this dismal, recurring cycle? Can this pattern be broken, and can Soviet-American relations be placed on a firmer footing?<sup>1</sup>

### INCENTIVES FOR DÉTENTE

Foremost among the shared interests of the superpowers is their common desire to survive the perils of the nuclear age. Nuclear war threatens not just the annihilation of countless millions of people, but the almost certain destruction—in truly nonpartisan fashion—of both Communist party control in the Soviet Union and democratic rule in the United States. An elemental concern with national survival provides the leaders in Moscow and Washington with a mutual interest in addressing the many sources of conflict that have the potential of triggering such a holocaust: miscommunication, miscalculation, accidental war, the escalation of local wars, the unchecked proliferation of nuclear weapons to unstable governments, and rapid changes in military technology.

Neither nation can achieve the desired level of security purely through unilateral actions; hence the incentive to reach agreement on such matters as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and SALT I (the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty). Tangible success has been more elusive in other areas, but at least pressing problems have been identified, and some very preliminary discussions have taken place. These include such matters as the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, limiting the sale of conventional arms, banning antisatellite weapons, and instituting confidence-building measures (e.g., advance

notice of large-scale troop movements and prior notification of missile test launches).

Soviet and American leaders also have a shared interest in attempting to place some limits on the astronomical cost of the arms race. For all their wealth, neither nation can afford the expense of unrestrained arms racing. In each country, a runaway military budget complicates efforts to deal with urgent concerns like unacceptably low rates of economic growth and pressing social problems.

Although clashes between the United States and the Soviet Union may make for dramatic newspaper reading and overshadow cooperative endeavors, these nations also have a broad array of other interests in common. These include such concerns as promoting mutually beneficial trade; preventing the escalation of regional conflicts (e.g., the war between Iran and Iraq); containing Chinese expansion; dealing with pressures from their respective alliance partners who want to see a lessening of tension within Europe; responding to the popular yearning for peace in their own societies; avoiding any deterioration of relations that would strengthen the hand of hardline elements within the policymaking apparatus of the adversary and would further exacerbate East-West relations; and addressing emerging global problems that cannot be resolved within the confines of a single nation (environmental deterioration, energy shortages, resource depletion, overpopulation and so on).

These powerful forces draw the United States and the Soviet Union toward closer relations. Moreover, aside from shared interests, each of the superpowers is influenced by additional concerns and calculations of its own which enhance the attractiveness of détente. In the case of the United States, efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union are prompted by the impact of electoral politics, the influence of traditional American assumptions about international politics, the goal of making the Soviet Union a more open and humane society, the hope of giving the Soviet Union economic incentives for avoiding international conflict, and the desire to weaken Soviet domination over East Europe.

Given the nature of the United States political system, electoral politics plays an especially important role in the framing of foreign policy. A presidential aspirant must demonstrate that he is decisive, that he is working for world peace, and that he knows how to talk to the Russians. Summit meetings with the Soviet leader are an ideal way to fulfill these needs and to gain invaluable media coverage. United States President Richard Nixon first journeyed to Moscow in the

election year of 1972, and even Ronald Reagan has found it necessary to create the impression that he would be happy to meet with President Yuri Andropov if conditions were right.

Various distinctive aspects of American political culture constitute another factor enhancing United States interest in détente.<sup>2</sup> Far more than their West European counterparts, American leaders tend to view international relations in a highly optimistic and voluntaristic fashion. It is often assumed that cooperation and harmony—rather than conflict and hostility—are the natural state of international politics and that once unnecessary impediments to friendship among nations are removed (like misunderstanding, miscommunication, or political leaders who are insufficiently responsive to the yearnings of their people), peace will reign.

Americans are often infatuated with what might be termed an "engineering approach" to international politics. It is assumed that every problem—no matter how long it has endured, no matter how complex it may seem or how emotionally overwrought the protagonists may be—has a reasonable and practical remedy. This optimism helps explain why many Americans viewed détente not just as a way of decreasing the probability of war, but as a mechanism for encouraging a fundamental transformation in Soviet society.

The long-term American hope was that détente, by stimulating the aspirations of the Soviet people for a much improved standard of living, would strengthen those tendencies within Soviet society that might constrain the Politburo's ability to spend vast sums on military equipment and to engage in expansionist adventures abroad. It was expected that the more the Soviet Union benefited from expanded East-West economic relations, the greater would be its incentive to avoid international crises and refrain from direct challenges to United States interests. Lastly, American policymakers have been attracted to détente as the best available means of inducing the Soviet Union to relax its grip over East Europe and allow a greater measure of economic and political diversity within that region.

But needless to say, in many areas Soviet perspectives on détente diverged sharply from those of the United States. Whereas United States policymakers hoped that an improved international climate would create strains within the Soviet Union's alliance system and provide the governments of East Europe with a somewhat greater degree of autonomy, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev and his colleagues looked to détente as a means of widening the fissures within NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and gaining Western acceptance of Soviet preeminence in East Europe. Where American leaders expected that détente would make it harder for the Soviet Union to expand abroad, the Kremlin hoped that détente would facilitate such expansion. Soviet leaders calcu-

<sup>2</sup>Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles, Or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968); Robert E. Osgood, *American and European Approaches to East-West Relations* (Washington, D.C.: School of Advanced International Studies, 1982).

lated that with an improved international atmosphere, American public opinion would be less supportive of a large military budget and would be less alarmed about the establishment of new pro-Soviet regimes in distant Africa or far-off Asia.

Economic considerations were far more important to the Soviet leadership than to their American counterparts. There was much concern in Moscow about declining growth rates, insufficient technological innovation, and slumping productivity. The conservative Soviet leadership feared that experimenting with far-reaching economic reform might unleash powerful internal forces leading to unwanted political liberalization. Having a great respect for Western—and particularly American—technology, the Soviet leadership decided that a major expansion of East-West trade was a far less risky way of overcoming its economic problems.

Lastly, Moscow was attracted to détente as a means of achieving one of its long-sought goals, namely, acceptance as a recognized equal of the United States. This objective had both a psychological and a political dimension. As Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs illustrate, Soviet leaders have had a chronic sense of inferiority, a feeling that as representatives of a great and powerful nation, they were not being accorded the deference and acceptance in the international community to which they were entitled. In addition, it was also felt in Moscow that the Soviet Union was fully entitled to all the generous prerogatives of superpower status that the United States enjoyed, like overseas bases, the ability to project sea and air power throughout the world, loyal client states, and a voice in the resolution of conflicts anywhere on the globe. Regular summit meetings with United States leaders, explicit United States acceptance of Soviet-American nuclear parity during the SALT negotiations, and joint communiqués endorsing Soviet-American consultations to alleviate international crises were seen as important milestones in the quest for acceptance as a genuine superpower and a full equal of the United States.

In short, the diversity of motives promoting détente reflects the complex and mixed nature of contemporary Soviet-American relations. In some areas, interests are very similar (e.g., preventing nuclear war and limiting the costs of the arms race); in other areas interests are directly opposed (e.g., Soviet attempts to split NATO and American efforts to weaken the Warsaw Treaty Organization); and in several instances the very different nature of the two societies calls into play factors in one country that have no direct counterpart in the other (e.g., electoral politics in the United States and fear of political liberalization in the Soviet Union). However, despite this complexity, there are many powerful forces and concrete interests drawing Washington and Moscow toward improved relations.

Looking at the many vital interests shared by the United States and the Soviet Union, it is a tragedy for both sides that they have not been able to forge a more stable and harmonious relationship. However, considering the explosive issues dividing them, it is remarkable that they have not done even worse in managing their differences.

One crucial factor complicating East-West relations is that ruling circles in both the United States and the Soviet Union are deeply suspicious of the policies and objectives of their rivals. In the United States, there is widespread concern that the Kremlin has not abandoned its long-term goal of world domination and is merely using détente as part of its tactics for achieving this goal. Soviet use of coercion and force, as in Poland and Afghanistan, reinforces this perception. On the other hand, Soviet leaders are concerned that the United States still remains unwilling to accept the Soviet Union as a legitimate and genuine equal in world affairs. It is feared that American policymakers have not abandoned their quest for military superiority and that they seek to pressure the Soviet Union from a "position of strength." American efforts to support dissidents within the Soviet Union or to improve relations with China are generally viewed in the worst possible light as hostile actions threatening the security of the Soviet regime.

Mutual fears are constantly nourished not just by the legacy of decades of deep hostility, but by a self-perpetuating cycle of reinforcement. In each country, there are influential forces convinced of the impossibility of reaching any genuine accommodation with the other, and militant actions (like armed intervention in the third world or efforts to increase military expenditures) strengthen these elements and weaken the position of moderates.

However, as important as the subjective element of mutual fear and suspicion is, it would be a mistake to exaggerate its significance. There are real clashes of interest as well. The United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in a sharp competition for influence and authority throughout the world. As the preeminent world power, the United States actively seeks to maintain its far-flung positions, to repulse challenges, and to prevent any diminution in its strength. In contrast, the Soviet Union ambitiously strives to increase its share of world power and to establish military bases and client states on all continents. The clash between the United States, a nation committed to maintaining the status quo, and a newly ascendant Soviet Union, determined to gain what it considers to be its rightful share of worldwide influence, is real.

The rapid pace of technological and political change further complicates this already difficult situation. Military technology is evolving at a rate that far exceeds the unavoidably slow pace of diplomatic negotiations.

As soon as one weapons system is brought under control, new opportunities threaten to create faster, smaller, or more accurate weapons. Each side is constantly innovating, fearing that if it were to slacken the pace, its adversary might gain a significant advantage. Uncertain about the future and unable to rely on familiar calculations of the past, the superpowers suffer a deep sense of insecurity; but their attempts to overcome this insecurity through further weapons development only heighten it.

Widespread instability in the third world has the same effect, constantly calling into question previous arrangements and understandings. The Soviet Union, ever in search of opportunities, has no trouble finding them. The United States, ever fearful of challenges to its present position, has no difficulty perceiving them. Neither side can step aside from entangling involvement for fear that its international standing as a world power will suffer and that its adversary will jump in and derive advantage. As in the area of arms control, the dizzying pace of change, the unpredictability of future developments, and uncertainty about one's rival all serve to thwart the efforts of statesmen to create order and stability.

However, at least in the area of arms control there has been a long process of intense negotiation between Moscow and Washington. Tangible progress has been achieved in banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in restricting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and in limiting antiballistic missiles. Progress has also been made in forging a common vocabulary and common concepts for discussing arms control problems.

In regard to the third world, comparable forward movement has not been achieved. Moscow and Washington have not even begun to talk seriously about regulating their third world competition, and they seem unable to do so. It is not just that their aims and objectives conflict, but that they have totally different conceptual frameworks for approaching the problem.

The United States believes it is perfectly legitimate to support existing governments—whether democratically elected or not—in their efforts to resist revolutionary movements, whereas the Soviet Union is equally confident of the legitimacy of its assistance to “progressive” movements working for the overthrow of established regimes. Neither side can openly agree to respect the other's spheres of influence since both hope to spread their own system throughout the globe. Nor can they agree on any binding ground rules to

<sup>3</sup>For an invaluable, multifaceted examination of the prospects for lessening superpower confrontation in the third world, see the articles in Alexander L. George, *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983).

<sup>4</sup>Moscow's contribution to the collapse of détente is stressed in: Theodore Draper, “Appeasement and Détente,” *Commentary*, vol. 61, no. 2 (February, 1976), pp. 27-38; Richard Pipes, *U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Era of Détente* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981).

regulate their competition. In part this is because neither has any confidence in the self-restraint and observance of these ground rules by the other; but even more fundamentally it is because each wants to maintain a free hand to intervene with force where and when it considers it necessary.<sup>3</sup>

Sadly, neither Moscow nor Washington has shown any great willingness to learn from the most recent collapse of détente. Each has a self-serving explanation of why détente failed. All the blame is placed on the actions of the other side. Neither is willing to acknowledge the ways in which its own behavior encourages similar conduct by its adversary, and neither has seriously examined aspects of its own conduct that might need to be altered. The long history of United States interventions in Latin America—of which Guatemala, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Chile, and Nicaragua constitute only the most recent and most dramatic—naturally influences Soviet conceptions of its global prerogatives, just as Soviet intervention in the Middle East, South Asia and Africa reinforces a militant stand on the part of the United States.

The consequences of superpower rivalry in the third world are truly ominous. On the one hand, a sustained improvement in Soviet-American relations is impossible unless real progress is achieved in regulating this competition. On the other hand, the problems associated with achieving such a breakthrough are so formidable that to make agreement in this area a precondition for an improvement in overall relations is to foreclose all possibility of forward movement. The understandable temptation is to postpone tackling this issue, but to do so only paves the way for bitter recrimination at a later date (as happened so dramatically in the mid-1970's). Thus the lessons of the past are not encouraging: it would seem that third world rivalry can neither be ended, regulated nor ignored.

To make matters even worse, both the Soviet Union and the United States bring to their interactions distinctive policymaking patterns and habits of thought that further complicate the task of building a constructive relationship. Even in the best of circumstances, when Moscow is genuinely desirous of détente, the Soviet Union is not easy to deal with. Soviet decision-making is characterized by a mania for secrecy, acute suspiciousness, a deep sense of insecurity, and an unshakeable posture of self-righteousness.<sup>4</sup>

All-pervasive secrecy makes it exceedingly difficult for foreign observers to know the full extent of Soviet aims and objectives. In the face of ambiguous and conflicting evidence, it is all too easy for Western pol-

*(Continued on page 336)*

**Paul Marantz** specializes in the study of Soviet foreign policy and East-West relations. His most recent articles have appeared in *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, *Orbis*, and *International Journal*.

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*"A relentless search for absolute security is a driving force of Soviet foreign policy. In Moscow's view, West Europe should be a Soviet protectorate. . . . It is determined to break the Western alliance along the Atlantic in anticipation of the time when West Europe, exposed to Soviet might, will assume the international stature of Finland."*

## The Soviet Approach to West Europe

BY ARTHUR R. RACHWALD

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**A**FTER the collapse of détente, the chaotic state of the Western alliance has offered Moscow fresh opportunities for diplomatic activism to project Soviet influence.

In the West, the economic difficulties that have added to the troubles of the alliance have produced sizable groups of disaffected citizens whom the Soviets consider "objectively" sympathetic because of their potential to cripple Western defense potential. These segments of the Western public have in recent years been subjected to one of the most intensive and comprehensive Soviet "peace offensives" since World War II.

Another part of the Western public considered by Moscow to be an especially valuable audience comprises the so-called realists. These are politicians of all parties who are unlikely to be swayed by Moscow's "peace-loving" protestations, but who are nevertheless acutely sensitive to changes in the balance of power and are thus ready to recognize and make political adjustments for the relative decline in American power. These same politicians, paradoxically, are alarmed by the renewed assertiveness of the United States under the administration of President Ronald Reagan because they regard it as a threat to peace. They pay attention when Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko declares that the United States "will not go unpunished" for attempts to strengthen its defensive capabilities. No attempt should be made to revise the existing correlation of forces, is the Soviet message.

By official Soviet calculations, the balance of power has changed considerably in favor of Moscow and its allies, with a consequently more acute struggle between capitalism and socialism and a sharpening of the internal contradictions of capitalism. These contradictions are above all a manifestation of class conflict. But they also include strife among capitalist states whose imperialistic ambitions are mutually incompatible. Proceeding from this analysis, Soviet leaders in recent years have concentrated their attention on accentuating the differences between the United States and West Europe to achieve their long-standing goal of breaking the Western alliance.

The security ties that bind West Europe and the

United States are similar social structures and a common cultural heritage. In the Leninist perspective, these are subjective factors, not immune to alteration. The objective reality—in this case reality conditioned by geography—is asymmetric American and European security needs. A threat to Europe is not necessarily a threat to the United States, and vice versa. Since World War II, the Soviet Union has sought political and military measures to accentuate this asymmetry.

The American doctrine of massive retaliation strategically bridged two continents. It was formulated during a period of nuclear monopoly by the United States and it was perpetuated in conditions of vast quantitative and qualitative American superiority and the invulnerability of the United States to Soviet strategic attack. It was crude and it was simplistic; but the massive retaliation guarantee for the security of West Europe left no doubt about the credibility of the American commitment. The Soviet Union had no equivalent and the United States could deploy its nuclear umbrella with impunity.

When the Soviet Union showed its potential for a strategic strike against the United States with the launching of Sputnik in 1957, American and European security requirements began to drift apart. Once the United States was no longer beyond the reach of Soviet nuclear weapons, Washington was compelled to reexamine the modalities of its military commitment to West Europe. The clarity and automatism of massive retaliation were supplanted by the ambivalence and equivocation of flexible response.

According to this doctrine, the United States would not employ nuclear weapons at the very outset of a conventional Soviet attack on West Europe but would respond in a gradual fashion commensurate with the level and success of aggression. Nuclear weapons would not be introduced as a first step but as a much later step; this element of hesitation gave rise to serious doubts about American willingness to use nuclear weapons to repel a Soviet attack against West Europe and therefore doubts about the American commitment to the European allies.

It was a critical development, destabilizing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from within and inviting Soviet probing. The United States had no easy option available to dispel the ambiguity. It could not, for example, transfer nuclear weapons deployed in Europe directly into the custody of allied European governments. Such a step would be too provocative to the Soviet Union and could fuel rivalry among the West Europeans themselves. The stage was set for a comprehensive Soviet drive to decouple West Europe from the United States.

In the 1970's, détente became a useful instrument in the hands of the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet Union agreed to United States and Canadian participation in the 1974 conference on European security in Helsinki, Moscow was given the opportunity to differentiate between the United States and the countries of West Europe. While Soviet relations with the United States were confined primarily to strategic arms control, Soviet dealings with the West Europeans were focused on economic, cultural and human concerns. By the end of the 1970's the United States had become deeply skeptical about the utility of détente. The West Europeans, by contrast, were generally pleased with its outcome and could conceive of no alternative, regardless of Soviet conduct in other areas of the world.

As the gulf in appreciation grew between the United States and West Europe, the Soviet Union attempted to promote the notion that détente was divisible. On October 4, 1982, *Pravda* noted:

For a number of historic reasons [détente] has put down deeper roots in some regions than others. This has happened in Europe, for example. Made wiser by grim experience, Europe became the cradle of détente.

Soviet policy toward West Europe has been influenced by an optimistic assessment of the global balance of power. After Vietnam and Watergate, the United States underwent an erosion of will and a diminished capability to project its influence. Proponents of neo-isolationism advocated a sharp reduction in United States commitments abroad. These were signals for the countries of West Europe to seek an alternative to security arrangements with the United States. Moscow eagerly communicated its eagerness to replace Washington as West Europe's nuclear guardian.

The Soviet global perspective provides a clue to understanding Soviet policy in West Europe. In its own analysis, the Soviet Union is in a "situation of military encirclement" owing to an unfavorable geostrategic location. This is in marked contrast to the United States ability to defend "its own national frontiers with a minimum of force."

This logic leads Soviet leaders to justify their search for absolute security, that is, for possession of a military capability to counterbalance simultaneous threats from the United States, West Europe and China while play-

ing a role in some minor conflict elsewhere in the world. It adds up to readiness for three and a half wars. Soviet pronouncements reject accusations that such an enormous appetite for security has destabilizing effects. The U.S.S.R. demands to be judged on the basis of its intentions, not on its capabilities.

The Soviet decision to proceed with deployment of the SS-20, the new mobile missile, for its long-range theater nuclear force (LRTNF), was based on calculations similar to those behind the introduction of ICBM's (intercontinental ballistic missiles) two decades earlier. As "sputnik shock" dismantled NATO's doctrine of massive retaliation, the SS-20's were designed to shatter the doctrine of flexible response. In a situation of strategic parity between the superpowers, the United States loses its ability to reinforce allies at the regional level with surplus strategic forces. The purpose of the SS-20's is to overbalance United States theater nuclear forces (TNF) stationed in Europe. This new LRTNF endows Moscow with "escalation dominance," an upper hand on NATO's attempt to balance Soviet conventional superiority with battlefield nuclear weapons.

Flexible response is plausible only when NATO has effective nuclear deterrence at its disposal. In the case of Western failure to halt a Soviet attack with conventional forces, escalation to the nuclear level should be available. This option to cross the nuclear threshold can now be frustrated by Soviet capability to escalate beyond the TNF level to the LRTNF level where Moscow has a monopoly. The SS-20's were designed as an instrument to emasculate NATO's nuclear deterrence and to liberate Soviet conventional forces in Europe from their vulnerability to nuclear counterattack. Only in these circumstances, Moscow could pledge no first use of nuclear arms, which, because of the calculus of conventional arms, was less than reassuring.

The official Soviet position rejects NATO's assessment that there is a disparity between the conventional forces of the two blocs and that the overall balance in Europe is a function of Warsaw Pact conventional superiority offset by Western advantages in theater nuclear forces. The Soviet Union claims there is a conventional forces balance. At the MBFR (mutual balanced force reductions) talks in Vienna, the U.S.S.R. asserted that in 1980 the "ground and air forces of NATO had 991,000 men, while those of the Warsaw Pact had 979,000." The Soviet Union said the West consistently overestimates Warsaw Pact forces by 150,000 men.

As a reaction to Soviet SS-20 deployments, in December, 1979, NATO made its "two-track" decision on deploying American Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe. The decision caused Moscow to fear that the United States was seeking both regional and strategic superiority. But it also enabled the Soviet Union to launch an enormous propaganda campaign designed

to stir the West European public against deployment of the new American LRTNF. The two-track decision offered negotiations with the Soviet Union, but if within four years the diplomatic effort failed, NATO would deploy 108 Pershing 2 missiles and 464 intermediate-range cruise missiles. These weapons would be based in several NATO countries to avoid "singularity," the deployment of new weapons exclusively on West German soil.

The NATO offer to negotiate was attacked by Moscow as prejudicial because it excluded from discussions the United States weapons already deployed in Europe, thus narrowing the scope of the deliberations to the existing Soviet system and two hypothetical American systems. This exclusionary rule also precluded accounting for 162 British and French weapons. These "impressive nuclear forces have no independent status," according to Moscow, owing to French and British membership in the Atlantic Alliance. "On what grounds, by what right are we to be left disarmed . . . ?" asked Yuri Andropov, the Soviet leader, in his April 24, 1983, *Der Spiegel* interview. "The Soviet people have the same right to security as the peoples of America, Britain, France and other countries."

The Soviets have also contested the military mission of the 572 LRTNF in Europe. For NATO, the limited number of these weapons testifies to their defensive function. Moscow, however, stressing the proximity of these new systems to Soviet territory, argues that their primary mission is to deliver a "decapitation" strike against the Soviet Union by destroying command and control centers with almost no warning. Deployment of American LRTNF in Europe is a move "conceived as a means of securing strategic superiority," the Soviet Union contends.

Soviet leaders maintain that their own LRTNF are not capable of reaching American territory and striking U.S. strategic systems. United States deployment, they say, would violate the principle of parity and equal security. In any event, the United States is not acting on behalf of West European security but in an effort to prevail over the Soviet Union and to sacrifice West Europe in a limited nuclear war. Deployment of the new American missiles would make the West Europeans "nuclear hostages."

As for the initial United States negotiating posture that the Soviet Union dismantle the SS-20's it had deployed in return for United States non-deployment of the new LRTNF—the so-called zero-zero option, Foreign Minister Gromyko said it amounted to the "unilateral disarmament of the Soviet Union" and would institutionalize by international law American nuclear superiority in Europe. Soviet leaders described it as an attempt at "diktat" by "compulsive gamblers and adventurists" conspiring for global domination. Moscow views in the same manner President Reagan's "interim solution," an attempt to produce gradual balance in

medium-range forces until a final solution can be elaborated, and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's "half-a-loaf" alternative for a reduction of the existing 350 or so SS-20's in exchange for limiting United States deployment to 100 missiles. Both proposals would allow the geographically remote United States to have nuclear warheads some five minutes flight time away from the heart of Soviet Russia. But especially undesirable for the Soviets would be the political consequences of deploying the American LRTNF, because deployment of these weapons would produce a convergence of United States and West European security interests.

The American zero-option proposal has been interpreted in Moscow as a preposterous demand that the Soviet Union "reduce to zero" unilaterally, that is, to dismantle all Soviet medium-range missiles and upset the "approximate equality" which Soviet leaders say exists. Instead, the Soviet Union has advertised its preference for an "absolute zero" solution to the problem of nuclear arms in Europe—the U.S.S.R. and NATO would possess an identical number of weapons providing that French and British systems as well as American forward-based systems were included in the balance.

This is just one of the most recent Soviet attempts to decouple American and West European security interests and extend Soviet military preponderance over the entire European continent. Only then could the U.S.S.R. gain unlimited access to Western technology and assume control of the domestic and foreign policies of the West European states. In the name of West European independence from the United States, the Soviet Union has been a champion of European security under its own sponsorship. West Europe and Soviet Russia occupy "one boat," insisted Foreign Minister Gromyko, who has served as a point man in Soviet efforts to arouse West European public opinion against American LRTNF deployment. So blatant were Soviet efforts to exert such influence in the recent West German general elections that the German government felt required to reprimand Moscow for its "massive and unprecedented . . . interference" in West German domestic politics. The Soviet Union has lost its propaganda battle to prevent the start of deployment by the end of the year. And for the moment transatlantic tensions within the alliance have abated.

#### **AMERICAN AND WEST EUROPEAN POLICIES**

Regardless of its importance for the United States, West Europe does not have a monopoly on American security commitments. It should be expected, therefore, that America's non-European obligations will occasionally clash with the regional security needs of West Europe. The Western alliance is composed of democratic and sovereign nations which retain their

prerogatives to question, if they feel the need, the prudence of American leadership and its policies in other parts of the world. Although the United States has the dual status of a global power and a self-appointed European power, there is no inherent harmony between the two. This contradiction is exploited by the Soviet Union, whose geography casts it in the role of a global and European power.

The prevailing attitude of the West European allies is that they want no part of American risks outside the European continent. Such sentiments were especially acute during the Korean War, the American war in Vietnam and the recent Persian Gulf crisis. West Europeans have no intention of being drawn into military engagements in distant parts of the world, despite the issues and interests involved. Europeans expect the United States to assign top priority to its European commitments and not to subordinate European policy to global concerns.

This was a primary reason for France's withdrawal from the NATO military command in 1966. The French action was explained as a way of preventing involvement "in a war which would not be our [France's] war and which could arise in areas not envisaged by the North Atlantic Treaty." Recently, and for similar reasons, the West German government refused to join American efforts in the Persian Gulf despite Bonn's substantial dependence on Middle Eastern oil.

For military, political and moral reasons, West Europe is highly apprehensive about American involvements overseas. The United States has been perceived as being willing to waste its resources on behalf of dubious causes resembling distasteful colonial wars and supporting unpopular, brutal and incompetent regimes whose survival is entirely dependent on foreign support. Moreover, the United States appears to be engaged in a worldwide ideological crusade, whose good sense is questioned. The conduct of American globalism has affected public support in West Europe for the alliance, since the defensive nature of American foreign policy is questioned.

This contradiction is also affected by Soviet-American relations. In the case of a confrontation between the superpowers—such as the Cuban missile crisis of 1962—the United States may appear to act recklessly, risking the security of Europe without consulting its European partners. On the other hand, when the superpowers attempt to reach an understanding on common concerns like nuclear nonproliferation and strategic arms limitations, the Europeans have reason to fear a condominium that might sacrifice their legitimate interests. It has become mandatory for West European governments to define their interests in national terms, putting a distance between themselves and the global politics of the United States. Since the late 1960's, when West Germany initiated its Ostpolitik,

NATO membership has no longer been incompatible with cautious but explicit balancing. As former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt put it, "neither a Pax Americana nor a Pax Sovietica."

For the Soviet Union, West Europe is at a crossroads. It is drifting, uncertain of its destiny, and could be induced to limit its Westpolitik. It has already outstripped the United States economically and is potentially formidable militarily. Yet this reality has not been reflected in the security policy of West European states. By Soviet calculations, there are no longer any real grounds for the continuing American leadership of the West. The relative economic decline of the United States is evident in the higher gross national product (GNP) of the Common Market states, their much larger share of world exports, their vast gold and hard currency reserves and, with one exception, their greater per capita income. West Europe is not only stronger than the United States economically, but it has different economic interests. For example, in 1980, West European trade with Soviet-bloc countries was 10 times greater than United States-CMEA (Council on Mutual Economic Assistance) trade. West Europe is also much more dependent than the United States on imported energy, including oil and gas from the U.S.S.R. The days of the Marshall Plan are gone, Soviet leaders argue, and West Europe has ceased to be a client; it has grown to maturity.

In the military sphere, Soviet leaders see a substantial decline in the American contribution to Western European security. NATO's European members supply 75 percent of the ground forces, 75 percent of the tanks, 60 percent of the naval vessels and 60 percent of the airplanes. In the Soviet perception, the United States is searching for measures to reverse this trend and is plotting to use its control over the nuclear component of NATO to shift the balance of power within the Western bloc in its favor. Using Russia as a scapegoat, the United States Defense Department is in the process of reorganizing the entire structure of NATO through an emphasis on nuclear forces at the expense of a less threatening conventional level, for the sake of Washington's "global imperial aims" and its "crusade against communism." Soviet leaders, therefore, are strongly advising the nations of West Europe to disassociate themselves from this "fatal path of confrontation with the Socialist world" and make their own judgments of a "bellicose" policy leading to an "annihilating nuclear war." The Soviet Union has made concrete proposals designed to turn West Europe away from

*(Continued on page 335)*

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*"The success of Soviet policy [in East Asia] is debatable. To be sure, Soviet military power was the agent of change in Kampuchea; but that change brought with it Vietnam not only as a strategic asset, but Vietnam as a large economic burden. In fact, the buildup of Soviet military power has led to greater political cooperation among the East Asian states. . . and it has increased their cooperation with the United States. It has also increased China's role in the region. . . ."*

## The Soviet Union in East Asia

BY RAJAN MENON

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THE Soviet claim to a rightful role in East Asian politics is neither surprising nor necessarily suspect.\* Through their southward and eastward expansion, the czars bequeathed a Eurasian state to the Bolsheviks. Today, about one-fifth of the 267 million Soviet people are of Asian origin, and this segment is increasing more rapidly than the Slavs, Balts and Moldavians. Of the 8.6 million square miles comprising the U.S.S.R., 75 percent of the land is in Asia. Because of these historical, territorial and ethnic influences, Asia occupies an important place in Soviet foreign policy. It is studied by Soviet scholars in the research institutes attached to the Academy of Sciences in Moscow, and in recent years the institutes have been asked for advice relevant to Soviet policy in Asia. Thus what may appear as imperial intrusion to some observers is, from the Soviet perspective, legitimate involvement.

Yet the very size of the Soviet Union and the increase in its military power in East Asia over the last decade has provoked a debate on a number of questions: What are the Soviet Union's interests in the region? What is the extent of its military power? What are the attainments and problems of Soviet policy as reflected in the Soviet Union's relationship with China, Japan and Southeast Asia?

Underlying the twists and turns of Soviet foreign policy, in one view, is a grand strategy. It involves a cunning use of growing military power to change gradually what Soviet leaders call "the correlation of forces." Meanwhile the will and unity of opponents are diluted: they are enticed by proposals for economic cooperation and peaceful coexistence and reassured that the accumulation and use of Soviet power are meant only to protect legitimate security interests.

According to the proponents of the grand strategy

thesis, Soviet power has recently been used with growing confidence either directly or through proxies to install pliant governments in the third world or to prevent their overthrow. Neither détente in the 1970's nor the Soviet citizen's aspirations for a higher standard of living have diverted the Soviet leaders from their imperial policy and the relentless pursuit of power.

This interpretation of Soviet policy has been applied often in East Asia, where much attention has recently been paid to the growth of Soviet military power. The number of SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers east of the Urals has grown; there has been a vast increase in the number of Soviet troops stationed along the Sino-Soviet border since 1969; and the quality and quantity of the ships and submarines in the Pacific fleet have likewise increased. Added to this has been the formation of an entente between Vietnam and the Soviet Union.

It is far from obvious, however, that Soviet action has led to the creeping submissiveness of East Asia. True, American military power—39,000 troops in Korea, 46,000 in Japan, and the Seventh Fleet in the Pacific—is one reason Soviet influence has not advanced further. But the actions of regional states should not be overlooked. China's move from rapprochement with the United States in 1971–1972 and normalization in 1979 toward strategic cooperation thereafter was essentially a response to increasing Soviet power; so was the change in relations between China and Japan, as witness their 1978 friendship treaty with its "antihegemony" clause. Japan's recent decision to increase its security role in East Asia, the greater political unity of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), and the attitude toward increasing Soviet power and the Moscow-Hanoi partnership in China, Japan, ASEAN, Australia, and New Zealand are all the result of the growth of Soviet military power in Asia, although none of these reactions should be overdramatized.

The Soviet experience in East Asia also illustrates that military power, in addition to being counterpro-

\*In writing this paper I have benefited from detailed discussions with Soviet scholars in the Institute of United States and Canadian Studies, the Institute for the Far East, and the Institute for African Studies in May, 1983. I thank the Vanderbilt University Research Council for supporting my visit to the Soviet Union.

ductive politically, can harm Soviet economic interests. Siberia is a case in point. Because of the depletion of energy and raw materials in the western Soviet Union, the dependence of East Europe, Cuba and Vietnam on Soviet supplies, and the Soviet need for hard currency to buy grain and technology, the exploitation of Siberia's plentiful resources has been a major Soviet goal since the 1970's. Because of Siberia's forbidding terrain and climate and the weakness of Soviet technology, the cooperation of advanced capitalist states is essential if Siberia's resources are to become available. Yet here Soviet military power has been a liability. The United States reaction to Soviet involvement in Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Kampuchea has largely ended the likelihood of any major United States involvement in Siberian development.

Though Japan has been involved in oil, coal, timber and natural gas development in Siberia since the 1970's, the lack of United States enthusiasm prevents the realization of Soviet hopes for extensive Japanese cooperation. The Japanese agree that the Soviet Union is the major threat to Japanese security, and they fear increasing economic dependence on the Soviet Union at a time when the Soviet threat seems to be growing. In addition, the dispute between Japan and the Soviet Union over the Northern Territories (Kurile islands) and the increase in Soviet military deployments there since 1978 reduce the inclination and the political ability of Japanese governments to promote vast Soviet-Japanese undertakings in Siberia.

This does not mean that Soviet policy in East Asia is foolishly conceived, clumsily executed, or a complete failure. The achievements of the Soviet Union cannot be denied; its claim to a legitimate role in Asia is supported by an extensive military presence there. Since the early 1970's, the Soviet leadership has been fond of repeating that no major international issue can be settled without the Soviet Union. East Asia is no exception. In sheer military power, no regional state is a match for the Soviet Union. China confronts clear Soviet military superiority along its northern border and must contend with Soviet-supplied Vietnam to the south. Compared to the Soviet Union, China's capacity for distant military intervention is weak, and it cannot supply arms to friends to match the quality or quantity of Soviet shipments to Vietnam.

<sup>1</sup>E. A. Hewett and Herbert S. Levine, "The Soviet Union's Economic Relations in Asia," in Donald S. Zagoria, ed., *Soviet Policy in East Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 202, 206.

<sup>2</sup>United States Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *Soviet and East European Aid to the Third World, 1981*, no. 9345, pp. vii, 14, 15, 18, 20, 23.

<sup>3</sup>United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1971-1980* (March, 1983), p. 118.

<sup>4</sup>Robert A. Scalapino, "The Political Influence of the USSR in Asia," in Zagoria, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

Thus the position of the Soviet Union in East Asia is based on its status as the region's dominant military power. Nonetheless, except for Indochina, Mongolia and North Korea, East Asia's trade with the Soviet Union is meager. No other state sends more than 4 percent of its exports to the Soviet Union or receives more than 4 percent of its imports from it. Indeed, ASEAN buys less than 0.5 percent of its imports from the U.S.S.R.<sup>1</sup>

Apart from Indochina, Soviet foreign aid to East Asia is also small. Soviet aid to the non-Communist third world represents less than 3 percent of all aid given, and very little of this goes to East Asia. From 1954 to 1981, only \$260 million or 1.2 percent of all aid and \$665 million or 5.6 percent of East European aid was sent there. Technical assistance was also negligible: there were no military advisers from Warsaw Pact states in non-Communist East Asian states in 1981; of the 9,300 East Asian military personnel trained in Warsaw Pact states from 1955-1981, 99.7 percent were sent from Indonesia in the Sukarno years; and in 1981 only 15 East Asians from non-Communist states were studying in the Soviet bloc.<sup>2</sup> For weapons, the non-Communist East Asian states looked to the United States and West Europe; between 1976 and 1980 none of them bought Soviet arms.<sup>3</sup>

As an economic or political model, the Soviet Union is neither inspiring nor relevant to most states in the area. The recent economic successes of Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan have been based on private enterprise and foreign investment. In Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, economic discussions focus on the capitalistic approach. Economists and officials concerned with economic development lack any detailed knowledge of Soviet economic writings, and a strategy for growth based on socialized property, administered prices, and comprehensive central planning is unappealing. Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan suggest a more effective path to development and Japan is a more attractive goal. In Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos, the Soviet model has a greater following. But here, too, recent economic experiments in China, Bulgaria and Hungary may suggest innovative forms of socialism different from the Soviet example. In Vietnam, for instance, economic policy since 1979 has accorded importance to material incentives and, within limits, to market forces.

The ideological influence of the Soviet Union is similarly small. The reasons for this are clear in democratic Japan and the largely authoritarian, anti-Communist ASEAN states. But, as Robert Scalapino notes, even the East Asian Communist guerrilla movements have long looked to China, while the religious and separatist groups lack firm ties with the Soviet Union.<sup>4</sup> Soviet Marxism, which has yet to free itself fully from the doctrinaire coils of Stalinism, must compete with freer and more creative European variants for the at-

tention of intellectuals drawn to socialism.

News that arouses interest about the Soviet Union frequently focuses on the Soviet threat. This hampers Moscow's efforts to present itself as a proponent of peace in the region and to play up the malevolent aims of China and the United States. Not that there is a lack of interest in the Soviet Union; but, except in Indochina and Mongolia, concern about the Soviet Union's military power and suspicion of its motives exceed its attraction as a political and economic model.

#### CHINA: THE ROAD TO RECONCILIATION?

The Soviet leaders have worried about China for about 20 years. They witnessed the frenzied anti-Sovietism of the Cultural Revolution and, in 1969, five years after China's Chairman Mao Zedong publicly declared the Sino-Soviet border to be a disputed area, Chinese and Soviet troops clashed. In the late 1970's they began to worry more than usual. American leaders were proclaiming that the two countries had "parallel" interests, and the common interest in containing Soviet power was stated dramatically at the Great Wall by United States National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1978. In January, 1980, Defense Secretary Harold Brown's visit to Beijing led to the announcement that the United States would sell "dual-use" technology to China; in June, 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig's visit led to reports that the United States would consider selling arms to China on a "case-by-case" basis. A large, populous China considerably strengthened by an infusion of American weapons and technology evoked Soviet suspicion and fear.

Today Soviet leaders are less apprehensive about the prospect of a strong Chinese-American alliance. In recent years, Sino-American relations have become strained because of disagreements over a number of issues: the future of United States arms sales to Taiwan; Chinese textile exports to the United States; and the sale of United States technology to China.\* China wants to be treated as a friend and a strategic asset—not an ally. For the United States, especially during Ronald Reagan's presidency, it is difficult to befriend China since the United States is subject to two conflicting impulses: anti-Sovietism and anticomunism. The former suggests that a strong, satisfied and friendly China might be a counterweight to growing Soviet power in East Asia. The latter, strongly felt by President Reagan, some of his advisers and the conservatives in Congress, suggests that there is a danger in building up a Communist state's economic and military power and a danger and immorality in abandoning anti-Communist allies like Taiwan.

Coinciding with the strains in United States-China relations has been news of movement toward better

\*Editor's note: For details see the article by Thomas Robinson, "China's Dynamism in the Strategic Triangle," *Current History*, September, 1983.

Sino-Soviet relations. Since late 1981, there has been a mutual willingness to exchange scholars, sign trade agreements and receive each other's athletes. In 1981 and 1982, the prominent Sinologist—and now Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister—Mikhail Kapitsa visited Beijing, and *Izvestia* commentator Alexander Bovin visited in 1982. In early 1981, the Soviet Union suggested various "confidence-building" measures, and at speeches in Tashkent and Baku in 1982 President Leonid Brezhnev acknowledged China as a socialist country and spoke of the need for improved relations.

In November, 1982, at Brezhnev's funeral, a widely discussed meeting took place between Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and his Chinese counterpart, Huang Hua. And in October, 1982, and March, 1983, two rounds of Sino-Soviet talks were held, thus resuming the September–November, 1979, negotiations that China had refused to continue because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

#### REASONS FOR COOPERATION

The Soviet interest in better relations with China is easily understood. The biggest blot on the Soviet diplomatic copybook since 1945 has been the transformation of China from a dependent and ally into an enemy, ideological critic and, in recent years (at least in Soviet eyes), a strategic partner of the United States. The intensity of Sino-Soviet polemics in the 1960's and a disputed border prevent rash optimism about a full reconciliation; so do the corps of anti-Chinese ideologues, scholars and soldiers created by two decades of Sino-Soviet hostility. But for the Soviet Union, a deteriorating relationship with China is not desirable. Because of the clear qualitative superiority of Soviet nuclear and conventional weapons, such a development would push Beijing toward further strategic cooperation with the United States and, by creating an aura of suspicion and hostility between the U.S.S.R. and China, it would increase the likelihood that a future border conflict would escalate. In such a political climate, the danger of a Soviet-Chinese confrontation during a proxy war—like the war over Kampuchea in 1978–1979—would also be greater.

China's reasons for wanting a better relationship with the U.S.S.R. are more complex. After the purge of the Gang of Four following Mao's death in 1976 and the defeat of the leftists at the third plenary session of the eleventh Central Committee of the Communist party in December, 1978, Deng Xiaoping was secure enough to pursue his policy. In economic affairs this meant pragmatism. In foreign affairs it meant differentiating far more explicitly between the two superpowers than Mao had done in his "three worlds" theory of the early 1970's, and it emphasized the containment of rising Soviet "hegemonism" in cooperation with the United States.

But not all party bureaucrats and officers in the

People's Liberation Army support Deng's policies.<sup>5</sup> They fear that increased contact with the West will lead to consumerism, a loss of ideological élan, and calls for democratization as exemplified by the New Democracy Movement. They also resent continued United States military sales to Taiwan. The Reagan administration, with its emphasis on fighting communism in the third world and its lack of sympathy for third world demands, appears to be an unsavory partner for socialist China and detrimental to its standing in the third world. And Deng's willingness to tilt toward one superpower suggests the danger that China will be taken for granted.<sup>6</sup> These sentiments are represented in China's top political institutions.

Soviet leaders have followed Chinese politics closely. They believe that early euphoria about the economic and strategic value of Sino-American cooperation is being replaced by increasing realism and disenchantment on both sides. Soviet scholars believe that the United States will be reluctant to give China enough technology and arms to increase its power considerably. In any case, it is argued, the Chinese would be unwilling and unable to bear the consequent burden of mounting debts. While China's relations with the United States are still expected to be better than its relations with the U.S.S.R., Beijing, in the Soviet view, will seek a more independent role.<sup>7</sup>

Aside from the difficulties between China and the United States, there are other signs of improved Sino-Soviet relations. Polemical exchanges are less frequent and venomous. China repaired its relationship with Yugoslavia—once castigated as the archrevisionist—in 1978 and, in October, 1982, political relations were resumed with the pro-Soviet French Communist party. In view of China's relationship with the United States since the 1970's and the policies of Deng Xiaoping, disputes centering on peaceful coexistence and capitalistic economic policies belong to a bygone era. And if Beijing once accused Moscow of abandoning

<sup>5</sup>See Harry Harding, "Change and Continuity in Chinese Foreign Policy," *Problems of Communism*, vol. 32, no. 2 (March-April, 1982), p. 12; Edmund Lee (the pseudonym of a Chinese scholar), "Beijing's Balancing Act," *Foreign Policy*, no. 51 (summer, 1983), pp. 28-30.

<sup>6</sup>V. P. Dutt, "China Turns Again to the Third World," *Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER)*, February 10, 1983, pp. 28-29. On the emphasis on the third world, see, e.g., Hu Yaobang, "Create a New Situation in All Fields of Socialist Modernization," *Beijing Review*, September 13, 1982, p. 31.

<sup>7</sup>Interviews in Moscow, May, 1983.

<sup>8</sup>Interview, Moscow, May, 1983.

<sup>9</sup>Zagoria, *op. cit.*, pp. 223-224.

<sup>10</sup>Interview, Moscow, May, 1983.

<sup>11</sup>In March, 1983, a Sino-Soviet trade agreement for the year was concluded while the second round of political talks was continuing. It calls for a trade volume of \$800 million. This compares with \$150 million in 1981, and \$300 million in 1982; see Mary Wisniewski, "The Trade Way Forward," *FEER*, March 24, 1980, p. 80.

its revolutionary duties in the third world, China's policies there have also become more pragmatic. Today China supports not mass revolution in the third world but established governments and economic reformism. In Southeast Asia, it has reduced its ties to Communist guerrillas to "moral and political" ties; Thailand, China's strongest supporter in ASEAN, has recently been waging a successful military offensive against its Communist party.

True, ideological differences are not central to the Sino-Soviet dispute. But a toning down of polemics, a decline in the significance of ideological disputes, and the eclipse of the leftists in China are important.

In assessing the prospects for progress in Sino-Soviet relations, a distinction must be made between secondary and primary issues. The former involve trade, and cultural and scientific exchanges. The Soviets expect an increase in such transactions. As a Soviet scholar remarked on China's recent stress on an independent foreign policy: "The Chinese want to milk two cows: a capitalist cow and a socialist cow."<sup>8</sup> In 1978, Sino-Soviet trade was a mere 25 percent of the 1960 volume. Yet after dropping steeply from 1967 to 1970 it rose 800 percent by 1978. While the U.S.S.R. now accounts for under 3 percent of China's trade, it is an important supplier of machinery, trucks, and timber.<sup>9</sup> Soviet scholars say that China has expressed an interest in Soviet assistance in modernizing the many industries built with Soviet aid in the 1950's. They also believe that China sees a better relationship with the U.S.S.R. as a requirement for any large increase in its trade with most East European countries.<sup>10</sup> More trade between China and the U.S.S.R. in the future is likely for three reasons: the Soviet Union is technologically more advanced; the two countries are neighbors; and the barter trade between them would not deplete their scarce foreign exchange reserves.<sup>11</sup>

The primary problems are the border dispute, the Soviet military deployments in Mongolia and along the Chinese-Soviet border, Soviet military aid to Vietnam, and Afghanistan. These are difficult issues and they defy quick solution. The Chinese and Soviet positions on the border dispute cannot easily be reconciled. China has stated that it does not expect the return of the 1.5 million square kilometers that it claims. It merely wants the U.S.S.R. to admit that these lands were taken through czarist imperialism in "unequal" treaties in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

But for Moscow to do so would be tantamount to confessing that it chooses to retain territory that it admits was seized from China. Thus Moscow insists that the treaties were not unequal and that the lands acquired were neither inhabited by Chinese nor ruled by China. This is not surprising. To concede the illegality of the Sino-Soviet border would set a precedent that might one day be invoked by the many other states that have lost territory to czars and commissars.

Besides, there is no guarantee that China would not use the Soviet admission to reopen the border dispute when power and circumstance became more favorable.<sup>12</sup>

As for military deployments along the border, a large Soviet reduction would diminish the major threat to China's security. This alone would not silence those unhappy with the Deng group's intention to give priority to light industry, economic reform, and technological modernization over military needs—they are motivated by too many diverse concerns for that to happen. But the appeal of their ideas might well decline.

For many reasons, however, a major decrease in troops on the Sino-Soviet border is unlikely. Troop drawdowns will be discussed by a Chinese and Soviet leadership influenced by a 20-year record of polemics, rivalry and suspicion. The Soviet Union has some 470,000 men on the border, and the Chinese have 1.5 million. The size of these deployments will inevitably mean military opposition against big reductions. This is especially true for the Soviet Union, where the military establishment has been one of the supporters of President Yuri Andropov in the Brezhnev succession. In addition, the growing economic importance of Siberia, its remoteness from western military and industrial centers, and the unfavorable population ratio against China in the east will cause the Soviet Union to be cautious.

While the Chinese would welcome a reduction in Soviet troops, their enthusiasm will also be tempered. For their security against the U.S.S.R., and for their economic modernization, the United States connection is important. Indications of a Sino-Soviet reconciliation, especially if they include a transfer of Soviet troops from east to west, would only strengthen the position of conservatives in the United States who warn that China cannot be trusted. Thus while a limited pullback or reduction in troops along the Sino-Soviet border cannot be ruled out, any major change in the military balance is unlikely.

An agreement on Vietnam, Mongolia and Afghanistan would be no less difficult. Indeed, in the negotiations, Soviet leaders have told the Chinese that these are not bilateral issues and cannot be discussed. This bargaining posture may change. The Soviet Union could not meet Beijing's demand for a withdrawal

<sup>12</sup>These observations are often made by Western experts. But they were made to me also by a Soviet scholar.

<sup>13</sup>United States Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, *Soviet and U.S. Defense Activities, 1970-79; A Dollar Cost Comparison*, SR 80-10005 (January, 1980), p. 11; United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government, *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1977* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 147; Paul F. Langer, "Soviet Military Power in Asia," in *Zagoria, op. cit.*, p. 267.

from Afghanistan and Mongolia and the cessation of support to Vietnam without sacrificing major interests; in doing so, however, it would have no guarantee that the nature of its relations with China would undergo a fundamental change.

But China's position on these issues might change, making agreement easier. Recent Chinese analyses refer to a host of problems that constrain Soviet power: declining economic growth and the resulting "intolerable pressure" of high defense expenditures; the resistiveness of East Europe; the "quagmire" in Afghanistan; and the burden of clients like Cuba and Vietnam. This could reduce China's obsession with the malevolence and power of the Soviet Union.

The outlook for Sino-Soviet relations, therefore, is mixed. On secondary issues, progress will be made and a more stable, less polemical and more hopeful relationship will result. But the primary issues will not disappear, and so mistrust and rivalry between China and the U.S.S.R. will remain, with each continuing to view the other as a major danger to its security.

Nonetheless, a Sino-Soviet war is far less likely than it was in the late 1960's or early 1970's. China's confidence has grown. It has a survivable nuclear missile force on land, and in 1982 it tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile. Therefore, the probability of a Soviet preventive nuclear strike, already low, will become even lower. Nor is a conventional war likely.

Given the present military balance, a Chinese attack against the U.S.S.R. is even less likely—and Soviet leaders realize this. Their troops facing China are numerous and well-equipped. But they account for only between 10 and 15 percent of Soviet defense spending and one-fourth of the Soviet Union's military forces. Seventy five percent of the 47 Soviet divisions on the Chinese border are only at 25 percent readiness.<sup>13</sup> The conventional and nuclear balance with the West is much more important to Moscow and it will continue to be.

If recent Soviet analyses of China are calmer, Soviet analyses of Japan display a new alarmism. As Marxists, the Soviet leaders respect Japan's economic attainments. They are also in awe of the military potential inherent in the advanced Japanese economy; this is probably increased by an awareness that, according to some calculations, Japan's industrial production has surpassed the Soviet Union's to become the second largest in the world. Unlike poor and technologically backward China, Japan has the prerequisites to emerge as a modern military power.

The possibility of Japan's rearmament disturbs So-  
(Continued on page 339)

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*"The Afghan problem certainly demonstrates the dualism for which Soviet foreign policy is well known. Soviet officials use military means to destroy the resistance and political means to build a compliant and functioning Communist leadership. In their relations with the outside world, however, they hint at a desire for a peaceful solution."*

## The Soviet Union and Afghanistan

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THE war in Afghanistan is nearing the end of its fourth year. Since 100,000 Soviet troops rumbled across the border on December 27, 1979, Moscow has been waging a brutal "little war" to crush the fragmented but fierce resistance. Soviet policy has three basic components. Militarily, it wants to defeat the main Mujahedeen (freedom-fighters) units, to protect Soviet lines of supply, especially in the strategically important Panjshir Valley north of Kabul, and to consolidate control over the cities and lines of communication. Politically, it seeks to entrench the authority of the ruling People's Democratic party of Afghanistan (PDPA), develop loyal cadres, and establish a reliable system of rule through pro-Soviet Afghans. Diplomatically, it pushes for recognition of the puppet regime of President Babrak Karmal, at the same time holding out the prospect of a negotiated settlement and encouraging the United Nations to continue talks toward this end. Meanwhile, Moscow keeps its options open and its intentions secret. A few words on the background of the conflict may bring into focus the current dilemmas that Moscow faces.

In the late 1860's, Czarist Russia's expansion in Central Asia reached the Amu Darya (Oxus River), the northern border of Afghanistan. For more than 100 years, Afghanistan and Russia coexisted uneasily, without a war. Indeed, the British in India were Afghanistan's principal antagonist.

Three Anglo-Afghan wars were fought, in 1839-1842, 1879-1880, and 1919. Though militarily backward and no match for Britain's powerful army in India, the Afghans fought fearlessly and made the British pay a stiff price. Britain accepted Afghanistan's independence and sovereignty in internal affairs in return for control over its foreign affairs. British policy was to maintain Afghanistan as a buffer state to block any Russian move toward India. This arrangement was formalized by Russia and Britain in 1907, when they concluded a far-reaching agreement designed to end their rivalry in Central Asia and the Persian Gulf.

However, after the third Anglo-Afghan War in May, 1919, Afghanistan gained control of its own foreign affairs. This development coincided with the es-

tabishment of Communist rule in Russia. A pariah state, Lenin's Russia wanted to prevent a possible British attempt to destabilize the new regime through intervention in Central Asia via Afghanistan. Accordingly, the Soviet Union was the first government to enter into diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, and the two governments signed a treaty of friendship in February, 1921. During the interregnum between the two world wars, Afghanistan adhered to a policy of neutrality. Relations with the Soviet Union were cool but correct.

The end of World War II brought momentous changes. Britain relinquished its empire in India; India and Pakistan were created by the partition of the subcontinent; and when Pakistan entered into a military alliance with the United States in May, 1954, the cold war intruded into regional politics.

The establishment of Pakistan as an independent country whetted Afghanistan's interest in the approximately five million Pushto-speaking Afghan tribesmen (known as Pathans) living in neighboring Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Under the guise of promoting the principle of national self-determination, Afghanistan incited the tribes to revolt and pressed for the creation of an independent Push-tunistan, hoping that Push-tunistan would eventually become part of a Greater Afghanistan. Such are the dreams that can turn into nightmares.

King Zahir Shah's appointment of Prince Muhammad Daoud Khan as Prime Minister in September, 1953, brought a new activism to Afghanistan's foreign policy—and a break with the policies that had been instrumental in preserving its independence. Daoud turned to Moscow for arms, advisers, and economic assistance in order to make credible his pressure on Pakistan. Arrogant, ambitious and confident of his ability to control the Russians, he paved the way for the Soviet penetration of Afghanistan, initially by invitation, eventually by military occupation. He discarded the traditional policy of neutrality and aloofness toward Russia and increasingly enmeshed the Soviet Union in Afghanistan's economy and army.

For the next 25 years, the Soviet Union was Af-

ghanistan's main patron. Economic development depended on Soviet credits and equipment: hydroelectric power stations, oil storage tanks, irrigation installations, auto repair shops, a technological institute, and a network of asphalt highways, including a two-mile-long tunnel through the Salang Pass in the Hindu Kush mountain range, which established an all-weather land route from Kabul to the Soviet border (and which was built strong enough to withstand traffic by heavy tanks, an incident the Afghans overlooked that took on great significance in December, 1979). When tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan periodically closed that border and Afghanistan's access to the sea, Moscow offered transit privileges and loans.

In the military sphere, Daoud's policy had profound consequences. A major arms deal was concluded in 1956, and thereafter Moscow became Afghanistan's sole arms supplier. Henceforth, the Afghan army and air force were equipped and trained with Soviet arms; military airfields were constructed at Mazari-i-Sharif and Bagram (outside Kabul); and road construction was pushed. The military infrastructure that was created after 1956 would, in time, service a Soviet army of occupation.<sup>1</sup> And it was from the officers trained in the Soviet Union that Moscow recruited the agents who toppled the regime in April, 1978.

During Daoud's decade in power, Soviet-Afghan relations were close. Government-to-government exchanges increased. Without seeming to jeopardize its independence, Afghanistan's heavy reliance on the U.S.S.R. resulted in an extensive Soviet presence unmatched anywhere else in the third world. But it adhered to a policy of nonalignment and judiciously refrained from developing better relations with China or exploiting the Sino-Soviet rift.

King Zahir removed Daoud in March, 1963, and sought to nudge the country back to a more centrist course. He downgraded the Pushtunistan issue, improved relations with Pakistan, sought to lessen dependence on the U.S.S.R., and introduced reforms aimed at transforming Afghanistan into a constitutional monarchy.<sup>2</sup> But the King was a reluctant reformer, incapable of reconciling the preservation of autocratic rule with the need for modernization.

In July, 1973, with the help of leftist army officers, Daoud staged a coup and established a republic, but he behaved very much like the autocrat he was. His efforts at reform were ineffectual, and his attempt to become less dependent on the Soviet Union prompted the restive Communists to seize power in a bloody

<sup>1</sup>Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Soviet Policy Toward Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), pp. 130-131.

<sup>2</sup>Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); chapter 24 provides a detailed assessment of the constitutional experiment and reasons for its failure.

coup on April 27, 1978. Daoud, his family, and associates were killed in the final shoot-out, victims of the maelstrom they had set in motion.

#### FROM CLIENT TO PUPPET

The new Communist government was headed by Nur Muhammad Taraki, one of the founders of the PDPA in 1965. The party had a split in 1968, with Taraki leading a majority faction known as the Khalq and Babrak Karmal heading the smaller, more pro-Soviet, group known as the Parcham. For a time the two groups cooperated, but three months after the Communist coup, Taraki purged the Parchamis, and Babrak Karmal sought refuge in East Europe.

Taraki zealously pressed radical reforms, thus alienating the tribes, the religious leaders, and the small urban middle class, depriving himself of both popular support and the loyalty of the thin stratum of administrators and technically trained personnel. Compounding this alienation was his decision to draw even closer to the Soviet Union. On December 5, 1978, a 20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed. Moscow greatly expanded its assistance and advisory personnel, and Afghanistan was drawn more intimately into total dependence on the Soviet Union.

However, dissatisfaction with Taraki erupted into open rebellion. By early 1979, attacks on the regime were intensifying, prompting Moscow to dispatch a high ranking Soviet military mission to Kabul in April to assess the situation. Taraki underestimated the hazards of pushing revolutionary changes while he was trying to consolidate his power; but he probably thought that Soviet assistance would be enough to underwrite the former and safeguard the latter. Instead, he lost touch with the popular mood and fell afoul of intraparty factionalism.

In September, 1979, Taraki was killed in a showdown with his Deputy Prime Minister, Hafizullah Amin. For the next three and a half months, Amin pursued an even more aggressive policy, trying to destroy the Mujahedeen. Like Taraki, he was confident of Moscow's support and welcomed the thickening flow of Soviet advisers and soldiers. However, the Kremlin had other plans. On December 27, 1979, it intervened in force, executing Amin and installing Babrak Karmal as its man in Kabul. Whatever independence of action the Communist regime had retained in the 20 months after the April, 1978, coup came to an end. The decisions for securing Communist rule in Afghanistan were henceforth made in Moscow.

#### THE MILITARY FRONT

Moscow has been fighting to crush the Afghan resistance for almost four years, with no end in sight. While trying to devise a political strategy to divide the opposition and entrench its puppet, Babrak Karmal,

it has bombed and strafed villages suspected of harboring freedom-fighters; burned crops in an attempt to starve the population; mounted repeated campaigns to depopulate strategic valleys; and, very possibly, has even used chemical weapons forbidden by international law.<sup>3</sup>

The war is being waged in most parts of the country. Heavy fighting has been repeatedly reported in the Panjshir Valley and in the vicinity of Paghman, Herat and Kandahar. In late May and early June, 1983, for example, there were reports of particularly intense bombing attacks in and around Herat and in the vicinity of Kabul. Soviet forces are employing helicopter gunships, massive artillery bombardments, flame-throwing tanks, and waves of air strikes against the resistance.

Soviet ruthlessness has made one Afghan in four a refugee. Out of a population of approximately 14 million, 3.5 million Afghans have fled, 3 million to Pakistan, the rest to Iran. Militarily, Moscow is bent on the systematic destruction of as much Afghan tribal society as is necessary to break the will of the freedom-fighters. Moreover, by forcing the Afghans to flee to Pakistan, Moscow may have in mind the destabilization of that country's restless North West Frontier Province and Baluch-speaking region, making Pakistan think

<sup>3</sup>Reports of attacks that used deadly chemical substances—"yellow rain"—first came from Laotian and Kampuchean refugees in the late 1970's. A major study by Sterling Seagrave, *Yellow Rain: A Journey Through the Terror of Chemical Warfare* (New York: M. Evans and Company, 1981), implicated the Soviet Union.

For some, the evidence is sufficient to substantiate the charges that chemical warfare agents are being used by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan (as well as in Laos and Kampuchea); for example, Robert L. Bartley and William P. Kuczewicz, "Yellow Rain" and the Future of Arms Agreements," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 61, no. 4 (spring, 1983), pp. 805-826. Others contend there are flaws in the case and still unproven assumptions; for example, Nicholas Wade, "The Deepening Mystery of Yellow Rain," *The New York Times*, May 5, 1983; and Charles C. Flowerree, "Chemical Weapons: A Case Study in Verification," *Arms Control Today*, vol. 13, no. 3 (April, 1983), pp. 2-3. A U.N. report in December, 1982, determined that the allegations were not proven, but that there was "circumstantial evidence" to suggest "the possible use of some sort of toxic chemical substance" in some of the reported incidents.

<sup>4</sup>Leslie H. Gelb, *The New York Times*, May 4, 1983. During a visit to Moscow, Gelb was told by Soviet officials about the increase in United States arms. When he returned to Washington, he confirmed the Soviet information with sources in the United States State Department and the Department of Defense. Apparently, in late December, 1982, the United States Central Intelligence Agency "was ordered to provide the Afghan insurgents for the first time with bazookas, mortars, grenade-launchers, mines and recoilless rifles." After the story appeared in *The New York Times*, the Soviets used it to criticize the Reagan administration for "torpedoing" United Nations efforts to find a peaceful solution (see *Pravda*, May 5, 1983 and May 25, 1983).

<sup>5</sup>United States Department of State, *Afghanistan: Three Years of Occupation*, Report no. 106.

twice before permitting any major buildup or supplying Afghan freedom-fighters on its territory. The refugees are lodged in some 320 tented villages in 23 districts in these two provinces.

The Soviet leaders are in no hurry to press for a final military showdown, possibly to keep casualties (running at about 1,000 to 2,000 dead a year) to a minimum, possibly because they are still considering some form of political compromise. Moscow also knows that although the Afghan insurgents can harass and thwart the pacification program, they cannot defeat the Soviet army, despite the stepped-up supplies of weapons covertly funneled to the insurgents by the United States.<sup>4</sup>

However, the difficulties and dilemmas facing the Soviet leadership are clear when it is realized that most of the weapons obtained by the Mujahedeen are Soviet weapons, which come from Afghan army defectors or from Soviet troops themselves, either those who are killed or those who sell weapons on the black market.

#### THE POLITICAL DIMENSION

Thus far, Moscow has been unable to fashion a unified and loyal political party to institutionalize Communist rule. The PDPA remains divided between Khalqi and Parchami, ineffectual, and devoid of a popular base. Babrak Karmal has met with little success in efforts to tone down the Communist and the Soviet character of the regime or to emphasize links to Islam and to Afghan tradition and culture.

The depth of the division in the PDPA can be gleaned from its inability, five years after coming to power, to convene a party congress. Instead, the first national conference (the distinction between a congress and a conference is an important one in Soviet and Communist political parlance) was held in March, 1982. Addressing the 841 delegates, Babrak stressed the need to overcome party factionalism and, according to a United States State Department report, denounced "anarchism, lack of discipline, alien ideology, hostility toward new party members, and the related sins of nepotism, localism, tribalism, and ethnicity in forming party cadres."<sup>5</sup> Nothing that happened at the Central Committee plenums that were held in July and December, 1982, suggests any lessening of the deep-rooted animosity between the Moscow-favored Parchamis, who are a decided minority, and the many more Khalqis, who are important because they have a larger following among the Pushto-speaking Afghans and in the military.

There are other indications that Moscow has encountered serious setbacks in its continuing effort to build a stable and compliant political system. Defections by government troops are widespread. As a result, the Afghan army is about one-half the size it was in 1978, and the bulk of the fighting is borne by Soviet forces. The National Fatherland Front, the umbrella

organization created in June, 1981, to mobilize the masses at the grassroots level, has accomplished little. Periodic offers of amnesties have had negligible effect. The economy is a net drain on Soviet resources, notwithstanding Moscow's exploitation of Afghanistan's natural gas production; shortages, disruptions, and low productivity are endemic. One recent study cites a Soviet scholar to the effect "that in economic terms Afghanistan had become another backward republic of the Soviet Union, whose deficits and development expenses [must] be met from Moscow."<sup>6</sup>

Seemingly undaunted by its dismal record to date, Moscow is building for the future. Thousands of Afghans have been sent to the Soviet Union for training and indoctrination, with the hope that they will return loyal to the regime, the satraps of the 1990's. Some of the tribes are accepting bribes. Avarice as the twin of collaboration has a long history in the saga of adaptation to foreign occupiers. In return for gold, tribal chiefs in the border districts do not permit draft-age Afghans to leave or enter the country through their territory, nor do they allow guns or supplies to enter. In April, 1983, 220 participants from five provinces attended a meeting in Kabul and heard Abdul Qader, an alternate member of the PDPA's Politburo, discuss the role that the border tribes are playing in the defense of the country's border.<sup>7</sup> Moscow seeks to exploit the deep divisions among the Mujahedeen. Meanwhile, it forges ahead with the building of an infrastructure of roads and bases, like the road bridge opened over the Amu Darya and the construction of the river port of Hayratana, designed to facilitate the flow of Soviet supplies and troops into the country.

#### SHADOWS ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT

The Afghan problem certainly demonstrates the dualism for which Soviet foreign policy is well known. Soviet officials use military means to destroy the resistance and political means to build a compliant and functioning Communist leadership. In their relations with the outside world, however, they hint at a desire for a peaceful solution.

For example, in January, 1983, in an interview with an Italian newspaper, Vadin Zagladin, a specialist with the International Department of the Soviet Union's Communist party Central Committee, talked of a "possible solution"; in March, and again in May, the Soviet ambassador in Pakistan said he was "optimistic about a political settlement of the Afghanistan issue"; and in an interview with the West German magazine *Der Spiegel* at the end of April, Soviet party leader Yuri Andropov said the U.S.S.R. had no intention of remaining in Afghanistan, implying a political solution was

<sup>6</sup>Henry S. Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1983), p. 237.

<sup>7</sup>Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *USSR International Affairs: South Asia*, April 19, 1983, p. D1.

possible. On other occasions, the Soviet leadership uses foreign visitors to convey a moderate mien to the world, and the Western media gobble up the oracular sops from high tea at the Kremlin.

In this cat-and-mouse diplomatic game, the principal moves are being made under United Nations auspices. On February 22, 1982, the United Nations Secretary General appointed Diego Cordovez as his personal representative on Afghanistan. Talks opened in Geneva in May, 1982, ostensibly between representatives of the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, but in actuality between Pakistan and Moscow. These have continued with regularity, the most recent round having resumed in Geneva in mid-June, 1983. Tantalizing murmurs of progress and near-agreement have been heard, but so far nothing substantive has materialized.

Moscow insists that Cordovez negotiate directly with the Kabul government, contending that its troops are in Afghanistan at the invitation of the Afghan government and will be withdrawn only after a formal request to that effect from Kabul. The Soviet Union's position, unchanged since its invasion in December, 1979, was reaffirmed in December, 1982, shortly after Yuri Andropov succeeded to the Soviet leadership on the death of Leonid Brezhnev the previous month. It holds that the Babrak Karmal regime is the legitimate government of Afghanistan, that Soviet forces are in the country under the provisions of the December, 1978, Soviet-Afghan treaty of friendship and cooperation, that any withdrawal should be determined between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, but not in any event until there are assurances that there will be an end to all "intervention from without, through the achievement of agreements between the Government of Afghanistan and those of its neighbors."

The impasse inheres in the seeming incompatibility between the Soviet and non-Soviet view of what constitutes "intervention," and in the conflict between Moscow's desire to have Pakistan recognize Babrak Karmal as the legitimate head of the Afghan government and Pakistan's insistence on four principles: 1) the withdrawal of all foreign (that is, Soviet) troops from Afghanistan; 2) respect for the sovereignty and nonaligned character of Afghanistan; 3) the right of the Afghan people to decide their own future; and 4) a return to conditions that would permit the more than three million Afghan refugees currently in Pakistan to return to their homes. A prime obstacle is the

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*In the Soviet Union, "no far-reaching economic reform has taken place since the five year plans were originally introduced in the late 1920's. The ramifications of a similarly momentous change today are enormous, and it is unclear if Andropov or even his ultimate successor will be daring and strong enough to oversee such a transformation."*

## Economic Problems in the Soviet Union

BY MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN

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**W**HEN the world economy suffers as badly as it did in 1981 and 1982, few if any countries escape the effects. Until recently at least a major exception was the Soviet Union. In the 1930's, for example, the Soviet Union managed to avoid many of the more extreme excesses that buffeted the capitalist world. In the most recent business cycle, however, that immunity seems to have disappeared. Much to its surprise as well as our own, the Soviet Union encountered its own economic problems. Some of the difficulties are the inevitable spillover effect from the problems in the outside world. But many appear to be unique to the Soviet system and are more than just short term. Presumably sooner or later good weather will return to the Soviet Union and the harvest will increase. What is more worrisome, however, to Soviet planners is that more and more of the Soviet Union's problems appear to be structural and not amenable to easy resolution.

Unlike most of the industrialized countries of the world, the Soviet Union was hurt, not helped, by the drop in commodity prices brought on by the world recession. Most industrialized countries like the United States and Japan benefited when the price of raw material inputs like petroleum declined. But while the Soviet Union is often described as the world's second largest industrial power, over 80 percent of what the Soviet Union exports to the hard currency countries of the world consists of raw materials. Petroleum exports alone make up over 50 percent of total Soviet earnings. Few realize it, but the Soviet Union is the world's second largest exporter of petroleum, led only by Saudi Arabia. Not all the Soviet Union's petroleum is sold for hard currency; nonetheless, as Soviet leaders have discovered, a drop in the spot price of petroleum hurts them as much as it hurts Mexico or Nigeria.

The fall in petroleum prices is painful because the decision on how much petroleum to export is almost always a function of the price of petroleum. The main concern of Soviet planners is to obtain a certain amount of hard currency. Thus when the price falls, unless the Soviet Union is prepared to cut back on its

imports, it must offset the falling price with a greater volume of exports. This is exactly what happened in 1982, when Soviet petroleum exports increased a record 40 percent. The overall effect of this jump in petroleum exports was to boost hard currency earnings for the year by about \$2.5 billion. In part, the extra petroleum for export was obtained by cutting back on consumption in the Soviet Union, by reducing exports to East Europe, and by reexporting about 6 million tons of petroleum from Libya. In all cases, this involved an increase in domestic economic and political pressure that the Soviet Union would have been spared had petroleum spot market prices been higher.

The Soviet Union would also have felt less pressured to generate export earnings if Soviet domestic needs had not been so great. Import needs were a consequence of what (it was hoped) were short-run difficulties. The Soviet Union found itself facing a fourth year of bad weather which, in turn, resulted in a fourth bad harvest. The Soviet Union has previously had two consecutive years of poor harvest, but never three and obviously never four. This necessitated a continual drawing down of grain reserves and more important, record levels of grain imports.

Because the situation was so serious, Soviet authorities found it necessary to supplement grain purchases with equally historic inputs of meat. In 1982, the Soviet Union purchased close to 1 million tons of meat, almost double the previous record. Together, the meat and grain cost the Soviet Union approximately \$10 billion in hard currency. More than anything else, these record food imports explain the need to generate hard currency exports. They also help explain why Soviet imports of machinery from the hard currency world have been reduced by as much as 50 percent during the last five years or so. The money had to be diverted for food.

The magnitude of the short-run problems have served to exacerbate the seriousness of the Soviet Union's long-run structural problems. Many of the Soviet Union's economic difficulties have been a bother for a long time, but the present crisis has not

only helped to sharpen the perception of just how serious economic conditions are, it has also tended to accelerate the process of decay and frustration. There is now even less likelihood that many of these shortcomings will be eliminated once the weather improves and the world economy recovers. Obviously, improvement in the weather and the world economy would help a little, but such improvements alone will not eliminate some of the basic underlying problems that face the Soviet economy. To see why, a closer look at various sectors of the Soviet economy is in order.

That Soviet agriculture should cause such headaches for Soviet leaders is tragic. There has been an actual decline in per capita production of most of the Soviet Union's basic food products. This must be all the more disappointing given the fact that, before the Revolution, Russia was the world's largest exporter of grain. Under Soviet leadership, however, it has become the world's largest importer. Even more surprising, despite the recent spate of poor harvests, the grain harvest in 1982 nonetheless represented a small increase in production over 1972. But since then Soviet authorities have attempted to increase their livestock herds. As a result, more grain has been diverted for livestock feed, and at the same time the Soviet population has increased.

Unfortunately, the average consumer seldom feels he has benefited from what should be increased meat production. In part, this is due to the fact that the Soviet worker's wages have increased faster than the increase in production, sale and price of consumer goods. With more money at their disposal, Soviet workers often believe that goods are in shorter supply, particularly given the reluctance of Soviet leaders to raise the retail prices of basic goods like food. But while retail prices have been held constant, the cost of providing both domestic and imported food has risen significantly, so that Soviet leaders now find themselves paying about \$50 billion in food subsidies a year.

The subsidies have increased present incentives, but not necessarily in the way the authorities anticipated. Because the price of bread is lower than the cost of growing the grain that goes into the bread, the peasants have found that it is more profitable to buy bread to feed their livestock than to use the grain that they themselves have grown for this purpose. As a consequence, about 4 percent of the bread produced in the Soviet Union is used as feed for livestock. This wastefully increases the demand for bread.

But the process does not end there. The peasants have also discovered that it is cheaper to feed the meat they buy in the stores (when they can find it) to the highly profitable fur-bearing animals they breed than grow grain in order to feed their own livestock. Once again, this leads to waste and, more important, to excessive demand, an endemic shortage of meat, and even occasional shortages of high quality bread. The

problem became so serious in mid-1982 that the Soviet authorities found it necessary to introduce rationing in more than a dozen cities.

#### **WASTE AT THE SOURCE**

Part of the agricultural problem, then, is due to the waste caused by poor allocation processes. However, 25 percent of the harvest never finds its way to the food storage and processing centers. Instead, it simply rots in the field. While it is usually poor weather that intensifies the rotting process, it turns out that even with good weather, problems would remain. It is certainly not their intention, but the central planners operate in a way that insures that the harvest will rot.

The explanation of this paradox is that the planners are located in Moscow and have no incentive to provide grain storage facilities on the farms themselves. Because there are so many farms, the planners would impose on themselves an enormous administrative headache if they tried to undertake the construction of so many projects at once. Instead, they prefer to build a few large facilities. These facilities are not only easier to administer; they are also bigger and more impressive than smaller facilities and so the planners look more competent. Of course, the larger such entities are, the smaller in number they will be because there are not enough resources to go around. All this explains why the grain storage elevators tend to be located an average of 200 to 300 miles from the growing fields.

Compounding the problem, the planners do not like to build roads. Without readily accessible storage facilities to protect the harvest, and without roads to move the crop to the more distant facilities, no wonder so much of the harvest rots. The return of good weather will help a little, but the likelihood is that a substantial part of the crop will continue to rot in the field until the investment and construction program is radically revised.

The situation in industry is not much better. The Soviets may produce 50 percent more steel than any other country in the world, but who cares? At one time, steel production was viewed as a symbol of power and even now it is not a factor to be ignored. But today the emphasis in the rest of the world is on the production of products which involve a higher level of technology. For that matter, a distressingly large share of Soviet steel production is of the lowest technology. Much of it is meant for military production, but much of it seems to disappear. In moments of candor, Soviet planners wonder where all the steel goes. Much of the steel is like the grain that is produced and never works its way to the consumer. As one Communist economist put it, "I never again want to hear how many tons of steel we produced last year. What good does it do me?"

Nor can existing Soviet steel mills be easily converted to the production of more useful steel products. The

technology of sheet steel used for consumer goods is so different from the steel currently produced that Western metallurgists argue that it would be cheaper for the Soviet Union to build brand new steel mills than to try to redesign existing plants. In addition, it will be difficult for them to use this more sophisticated steel even if they produce it. Presumably, it will be used for the production of consumer goods, which requires not only sheet steel but a large tool die industry; tool dies are essential for the preparation of model changes. Because model changes have come so infrequently in the Soviet Union and because the consumer goods industry in the Soviet Union is generally underdeveloped, the Soviet Union has almost no tool die industry. This will prove another obstacle to any industrial modernization.

#### THE FAILURE OF CENTRAL PLANNING

Just as is true in agriculture, central planning bears much of the blame for the failure of Soviet industry to keep up with the outside world. In deciding in which direction the economy should move, the central planners tend to follow a course that makes life easier for the planners; that is not necessarily the same as doing what is best for the economy. The planners have resisted economic reform. They continue to stress the same old use of the production target specified in quantity terms such as tons and numbers of a unit produced. This makes it easy for the planners to judge how much better production is this year compared to last year, but it tends to discourage anyone who seeks to emphasize quality or innovation, which is much more difficult to measure. As a result, Soviet industry is lagging far behind industry in the rest of the world.

Today, many capitalist nations are discussing the feasibility of adopting an industrial policy. An industrial policy usually seeks to provide guidance to the economy as it seeks to deemphasize heavy industrial products like steel and unsophisticated machine tools and moves instead to sophisticated products like computers and computer-operated equipment. While such products add significantly to industrial productivity and worker satisfaction, they are also subject to rapid obsolescence. The life cycle of the majority of such items is as short as two to three years. This means very rapid change. In theory, one would think that a central planning system would be able to respond better than a basically anarchistic capitalist system to such a rapidly moving industrial restructuring.

It turns out, however, that a centrally planned system, or at least the Soviet model, seems just as unable as most capitalist societies to implement what has come to be called "an industrial policy." The main function of Soviet planners seems to be to oversee the division of investment funds among different industrial sectors. However, that is not the same as withdrawing funds from obsolete sectors and assigning them to new industrial initiatives. If anything, planning in the Soviet

systems has taken the form of extending capital funds to increase the scope of already mastered techniques.

Phasing out or closing down obsolete industries has proved to be particularly difficult. Closing down a factory or a production line normally necessitates unemployment, and the Soviet Union has always made much of the fact that there is no unemployment in the Soviet Union. Admittedly, there is some temporary unemployment for people between jobs, and political dissidents often find themselves without work. Moreover, anyone who has observed the large number of workers who sit idly all day in Soviet offices and factories realizes that there is an enormous amount of disguised unemployment in the Soviet Union. But despite one or two experiments, the outright firing of workers is most uncommon. From the workers' point of view this is a most humane policy, but it comes at a price.

The Soviet economic system lacks an efficient mechanism for closing down inefficient and outdated processes and products. Theoretically, an active industrial policy unit could provide for the transfer of resources and materials and the retraining of labor so that the economy could move rapidly to newly emerging industries and leave behind less sophisticated technologies. But so far it appears that Gosplan (the state planning organization) has barely attempted to act on such issues.

To the extent that any government seems able to deal with such matters, it is the Japanese, the French, the Taiwanese, and various American governors in states like North Carolina that are at least alert and responsive to the issues involved. In other cases, industrial entrepreneurs and venture capitalists have taken the initiative on their own. In Massachusetts, for example, enough of these entrepreneurs responded individually to create a qualitative change in the state's industrial profile, so that today Massachusetts is one of the world's leading centers of high technology. In other words, industrial renovation can be a product of central planning when the planners are bold and prepared to suffer the pains that come with deliberately created unemployment. Alternatively, industrial renovation can be the by-product of the quest for individual profits by individual decision-makers who must deal with the finality of a capitalist marketplace where, when products are no longer salable, the businesses that produced them go bankrupt. Unfortunately for the Soviet Union, the planners are usually not that venturesome and there are no legitimate private entrepreneurs, at least in the eyes of the state.

It is not surprising, therefore, that what has come to be called high technology industry has had a difficult time establishing itself in the Soviet Union. This difficulty is all the more striking given the fact that the Soviet Union spends approximately 12-14 percent of its GNP (gross national product) for military purposes.

In other countries of the world, there have been many spinoffs from the military to the civilian sector. But even though most factories producing military products in the Soviet Union also manufacture consumer goods, there is very little spinoff. Again, this seems to be a consequence of the pressure on managers of civilian factories to fulfill quantitative targets. Few managers want to disrupt the production process or risk losing their bonus in order to see if they can produce something new, particularly since there is no offsetting bonus for anyone who dares to be innovative.

For many years this did not seem to be a large problem. Soviet industry lagged behind most Western technologies, but the gap seemed to be closing. With the advent of the computer and the microchip age, and the speed up of product obsolescence, Soviet industries seem to be further behind than was the case a decade or so ago. Whole new industries have been created (and some have already died) in the United States and Japan, but few such industries have been introduced in the Soviet Union. It was only about a year or so ago, for example, that the Soviet Union was able to master the production of a limited number of digital watches. They are still having problems producing the hardware and software for large, not to mention mini, or micro, computers.

As if their problems in the world of high technology industry were not serious enough, the Soviet Union has also begun to have problems with its more conventional industries. The rate of economic growth began to fall from the impressive heights it obtained in the 1950's, so that by the mid-1970's, growth rates were sometimes as low as 2-3 percent compared to the 7 percent or more recorded earlier. Even more striking, production of some major products like steel and coal actually began to decline. Except during World War II, such a drop in actual production was unprecedented.

Many factors were responsible for this drop. The bad weather that affected agriculture also disrupted industrial work schedules. Railroad shipments fell behind. Raw material supplies in the Western part of the Soviet Union began to give out. This meant raw materials from more distant regions of the Soviet Union had to be utilized, which inevitably increased the burden on the nation's shipping facilities. Simultaneously, the number of new entrants into the work force began to decline, and discipline in the work force seemed to deteriorate. Absenteeism, alcoholism and corruption began to increase. The continuing shortage of consumer goods relative to consumer purchasing did nothing to stimulate worker productivity. The relative increase in savings bank deposits far exceeded the increase in retail sales. Nor did the four bad harvests help. In 1982, many cities across the Soviet Union actually found it necessary to introduce food rationing.

The situation improved at least temporarily in late

1982, when Yuri Andropov took control after President Leonid Brezhnev's death. Andropov placed great stress on discipline, and the results were immediate. Thus while production of most items in the first three months of 1982 fell compared to production a year earlier, production in January, February and March, 1983, rose sharply. For example, steel production, which fell 5 percent in January, 1982, compared to January, 1981, rose 5 percent in January, 1983. Radio production, which also fell 5 percent in January, 1982, rose 15 percent in January, 1983. The results for January partially reflect the fact that there was one less working day in January, 1982, than in January, 1981, or January, 1983, but that is not enough to explain the rapid shift.

By mid-1983, some of the initial enthusiasm for Andropov's discipline apparently had begun to wear thin; and some of the growth rates began to drop. But even if these growth rates should rise again, the solution to the Soviet Union's economic problem requires more than a mere increase in steel production. As we have seen, the Soviet Union already produces too much of the wrong kind of steel. What is needed is a new incentive system that will stimulate better quality and innovation. This may, in turn, require a decentralization of decision making so that factory managers and workers will have more incentive to experiment with new and better products, especially those in the high technology sector. An increase in discipline and planning centralization is not the way to solve this.

For a time, Soviet officials thought they might solve some of their economic problems by importing the advanced technology that they seemed unable to produce. Thus, they imported automobile plants, foundries and chemical factories. Then, as the Soviet leaders found it necessary to import larger and larger quantities of food, the import of machinery began to diminish. It is unclear, however, if that drop was due to the need to divert hard currency to buy more food, because at the same time Soviet economists and leaders seem to have become considerably less infatuated with foreign technology. A growing number of Soviet authorities have begun to notice that the purchase of foreign equipment is no longer a guarantee that this equipment will solve Soviet problems. The specialists have come to realize that equipment that was designed for an economy predicated on the existence of scarcity may malfunction in a society governed by planning and supposedly without scarcity.

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*In Soviet technology, there has been "little if any progress since the late 1950's in catching up to the West. Although Soviet technology has continued to advance, Western technology has moved at least as fast, and Soviet chances of surpassing the West now seem far more remote than they did at the time of Stalin's death."*

## Technology and the Soviet System

BY BRUCE PARROTT

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**A**LMOST exactly 26 years ago the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the first man-made earth satellite, and sent the American public into a paroxysm of despair. Sputnik ignited American fears that the Soviet Union would soon surpass the United States technologically—if indeed it had not already done so—and pose an unprecedented economic and military challenge to American security. Today, however, American views of Soviet technological capacities have swung almost to the opposite extreme. Although many Americans are apprehensive about the expanding Soviet military capabilities, many also believe that the Soviet system is technologically stagnant and that without infusions of American know-how it might collapse.

This dramatic shift of American perceptions stems partly from better understanding, partly from politics. Under Premier Nikita Khrushchev, Soviet ideologists trumpeted the U.S.S.R.'s technological achievements, both real and imaginary. The regime's secretiveness and the lack of careful Western studies of Soviet technology meant that worried Americans often gave these claims more credence than they deserved. Since that time, painstaking work by independent scholars has gradually built up a more accurate picture of Soviet achievements and failings, and a dramatic slowdown of Soviet economic growth has thrown the failings into sharper relief.<sup>1</sup> The change of perception has been all the greater because some Americans, concerned about United States setbacks in the superpower competition with the Soviet Union, have seized on these findings for ideological and political purposes of their own. From their standpoint, the United States is furnishing indispensable technology to a backward but dangerous adversary, when it should be withholding this aid or

<sup>1</sup>Eugene Zaleski, et al., *Science Policy in the USSR* (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development, 1969); Ronald Amann, Julian Cooper and R. W. Davies, eds., *The Technological Level of Soviet Industry* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); and Ronald Amann and Julian Cooper, eds., *Industrial Innovation in the Soviet Union* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

<sup>2</sup>Carl Gershman, "Selling Them the Rope: Business and the Soviets," *Commentary*, April, 1979, pp. 35-45.

providing it only in exchange for large Soviet political concessions.<sup>2</sup>

Neither the extreme views of the 1950's nor those of the 1980's do justice to the realities of the present situation. The Soviet Union indeed lags behind the developed West in many fields, but this does not mean that Soviet technology is standing still. If the Soviet system were as stagnant technologically as some observers seem to believe, it would be impossible to explain how the regime created the weapons that today constitute such a formidable threat to the West. Moreover, the role of Western technology in Soviet development is more complex than is commonly understood. Why, for instance, did the Soviet economy grow so rapidly under Premier Joseph Stalin, even though it was cut off from Western technology during much of his time in power? And why has its growth slowed markedly in the post-Stalin years, when technology transfers from the West have risen steeply? Nor should we neglect the political forces affecting efforts to use Western technology as either a diplomatic carrot or a stick against the Soviet Union. Even if Western know-how is vital to the Soviet Union, its utility as a foreign policy tool depends on the constellation of political forces both in the West and inside the Soviet regime.

### STALIN'S POLICY

The strengths and weaknesses of contemporary Soviet technology are primarily the result of institutions and policies that crystallized during the Stalin era. When Stalin and his supporters took control of the Soviet government in the late 1920's, an enormous gap separated the Soviet Union from the technological level of the capitalist powers. Determined to eliminate this gap, the Stalinists embarked on a program of forced development that caused vast human suffering but produced very rapid economic growth. Virtually all the growth was in industry, especially heavy industry, because the party leaders were striving desperately to construct a military shield against the outside world.

The Stalinists were convinced that for strategic as well as internal political reasons they must make the Soviet Union independent of the world economy. This

conviction led to lavish Soviet spending on domestic research and development (R&D) during the 1930's—spending that far exceeded the proportion of gross national product (GNP) that most semideveloped countries today devote to R&D. The Stalinists, however, were also convinced that the risk of a major war within the decade was so great that they could not wait for domestic R&D to become an independent source of technological advance.

Therefore, during the early 1930's, they drew very heavily on imported capital equipment, external assistance in designing new factories, and other forms of technology transfers from abroad. Their aim was to make a quick transition from Western technology to native research and production, and as the decade progressed they turned decisively toward economic autarky.<sup>3</sup>

The realm in which the Stalinists achieved their greatest technological successes was military weaponry. In the military sphere, they effectively combined early access to foreign technology with a dynamic R&D program. During the early 1930's, the regime was able to purchase models of Western weapons together with necessary manufacturing technology, and it used this know-how as a basis for further indigenous innovation.<sup>4</sup> A fast pace of domestic weapons development was possible because military R&D enjoyed an overriding political priority that enabled innovators to surmount widespread shortages of supplies, skilled manpower and other administrative bottlenecks. In weapons production, unlike other industrial sectors, the "consumer," i.e., the military establishment, had the necessary clout to reject unsatisfactory output. Moreover, centrally organized competition among the designers of prospective weapons systems spurred an unusually high rate of indigenous innovation.

Lacking these special benefits, other industrial branches did not fare so well. As they were weaned from capital imports and technological assistance from the West, they had serious difficulty generating advanced new technology of their own. In part this was because weapons-related R&D consumed a large share of the available resources; but there were additional causes. The economic system relied on top-level initiative to drive innovation, and the central authorities could spread their attention only so far. Outside top-priority sectors, the institutional momentum of the

<sup>3</sup>Bruce Parrott, *Politics and Technology in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983), chapter 2.

<sup>4</sup>David Holloway, "Innovation in the Defense Sector," and "Innovation in the Defense Sector: Battle Tanks and ICBMs," in Amann and Cooper, *op. cit.*, pp. 283–284, 371–372.

<sup>5</sup>Joseph Berliner, *The Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1976).

<sup>6</sup>Philip Hanson, *Trade and Technology in Soviet-Western Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), pp. 66–67

planning apparatus rewarded enterprises for producing ever greater quantities of the same goods and punished them for trying to introduce new technology at the expense of greater output. High pressure production targets that penalized factories that shut down to retool, the lack of market competition from other enterprises, and an unreliable supply system all made factory officials reluctant to promote new technology.<sup>5</sup> Further, most R&D was performed in institutes separate from the enterprises, and bureaucratic obstacles hampered the application of promising technical ideas at the factories. Some native technical ideas were introduced into nonmilitary production, but the process was slow and difficult.

Despite these problems, Soviet industry grew at a very rapid rate under Stalin. The principal reason for this was the regime's exceptional ability to mobilize and channel investments and manpower into more productive economic sectors. This mobilization capacity, which depended on rigorous central planning and a ruthless willingness to sacrifice popular consumption for the sake of industrial expansion, had special utility at a stage of economic development when many resources like agricultural labor and mineral deposits were still underutilized. In addition, the heavy commercial infusion of Western technology during the early 1930's (and to a lesser extent, American Lend-Lease assistance during World War II and the confiscation of German and Japanese technology at the end of the war) helped compensate for the barriers to native research and innovation. Not least important, these barriers did not matter so much in Stalin's time as they do today. The Stalinist regime was building an industrial economy almost from the ground up. A great deal of technological change therefore occurred through the construction of new plants producing new goods. Although difficult, this sort of innovation was nevertheless easier for the system to manage than the introduction of new technology at preexisting plants, where the administrative contradiction between production and innovation caused managers to resist introducing new products and processes.<sup>6</sup>

In the post-Stalin period, however, innovation at operating enterprises has become more urgent. The aging of the factories built during an earlier era has heightened the need to modernize old technology. In addition, Stalin's successors, seeking to reduce internal pressures and to improve popular welfare, have fundamentally modified Stalin's draconian concentration on heavy industrial investment. President Leonid Brezhnev, especially, slowed the growth of capital investment and channeled more available investment resources into consumer-oriented sectors like agriculture. Since investment is now expanding more slowly and a smaller proportion of it is going into new industrial enterprises, the need for energetic innovation at established plants has become correspondingly

greater. The recent slackening of growth in the labor force adds another complication. When less growth can be obtained by mobilizing new investment and labor for preferred industries, more widespread technological change is necessary to sustain an adequate rate of economic growth.

These circumstances should not cause us to ignore genuine Soviet technological accomplishments. Under Stalin, the country substantially reduced the gap separating it from the developed West. It made impressive advances in several basic industries, like iron and steel and electric power transmission, where progress does not depend heavily on scientific research; and in some segments of those industries it is now close to being on a par with Western technical achievements. The Soviet system also managed to make very large advances in military weaponry, the research-intensive sector that enjoyed supreme political priority.

However, in other research-intensive industries, like chemical production and electronics, it has performed much more poorly and remains far behind Western standards. Thus, on balance, the country has made little if any progress since the late 1950's in catching up to the West.<sup>7</sup> Although Soviet technology has continued to advance, Western technology has moved at least as fast, and Soviet chances of surpassing the West now seem far more remote than they did at the time of Stalin's death.

#### WESTERN TECHNOLOGY

The gradual recognition of this fact provoked considerable dismay among Stalin's successors, and they responded in two ways. One response, advocated by many economists and specialists, was to seek large new transfers of Western technology to bolster Soviet progress.<sup>8</sup> The rapid postwar growth of intra-Western trade and technology transfers was providing important new economic gains to the Soviet Union's main Western rivals, thereby increasing the competitive burden of Soviet technological isolation. The regime's second form of response to its persisting technological lag was to restructure domestic research and industry in order to accelerate indigenous innovation. Adumbrated in the Khrushchev years, both impulses became more pronounced under Brezhnev.

To date, neither response has had a major impact

<sup>7</sup>R. W. Davies, "The Technological Level of Soviet Industry: An Overview," in Amann, Cooper and Davis, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

<sup>8</sup>Erik P. Hoffmann and Robbin F. Laird, *The Politics of Economic Modernization in the Soviet Union* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982).

<sup>9</sup>Hanson, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-132.

<sup>10</sup>Parrott, *op. cit.*, chapters 5 and 6; Bruce Parrott, *Information Transfer in Soviet Science and Engineering: A Study of Documentary Channels* (Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand Corporation, 1981).

<sup>11</sup>Hanson, *op. cit.*, chapter 11.

on Soviet economic performance. For one thing, the infusion of Western technology has not been so large as is popularly believed. Soviet imports of Western capital equipment have climbed sharply over the last 15 years, but they began from a very low level and still constitute a modest share of Soviet domestic investment in equipment—roughly five to seven percent of the total in the late 1970's.<sup>9</sup> This share is far smaller than it was in the first years of Stalin's industrialization drive. Transfers of unembodied technology—know-how in the form of licenses, technical literature, and exchanges of experts—are also limited. For political reasons the regime remains wary of economic dependence on the West and is especially hesitant to participate in the extensive international exchanges of people and information that facilitate the diffusion of advanced technology. More than most Western critics of technology transfers to the Soviet Union realize, the regime's attempts to avoid ideological contamination from the West have hampered its efforts to absorb Western technical knowledge.<sup>10</sup>

Another reason that the infusion of Western technology has not yielded more is that many of the problems that bedevil domestic innovation also make it difficult to obtain maximum results from foreign equipment and know-how. In the 1970's, Western and Soviet observers both arrived, with different emotions, at the conclusion that Western technology could serve as an effective substitute for domestic reform in the Soviet Union. This conclusion, however, exaggerates the possibility of overcoming the system's defects simply by obtaining more Western inputs. Soviet economists, for instance, have traditionally complained that many domestically engineered factories are inefficient because construction takes so long that basic designs become outdated before the plants start operating.

The same problem has affected the assimilation of recent capital imports. A study of large industrial installations imported from Great Britain shows that the elapsed time between the signing of an import agreement and the commissioning of the installation was two or three times the interval required for comparable British exports to other Western countries. Labor productivity at these installations also tended to be lower than at similar facilities in the West—no doubt partly because Soviet plant managers still felt compelled to hoard surplus labor as protection against unexpected demands from the central planners.<sup>11</sup>

It remains true that capital imports from the West have been installed faster than Soviet-made equipment, and they have undoubtedly conferred real gains in productivity in comparison with indigenous Soviet technology. But these gains are limited by the internal inefficiencies of the economic system. Although the recent influx of Western technology has probably added something in the vicinity of half a percentage point to Soviet industrial growth each year, this has

been far from sufficient to stem the country's steady loss of economic momentum.<sup>12</sup>

Only by improving domestic research and innovation will the Soviet Union significantly upgrade its ability to benefit from Western technology and—above all—its ability to move beyond the levels of that technology. During the late 1960's and 1970's, the regime did take some steps to reduce the barriers to indigenous innovation by strengthening the monetary incentives for institutes and enterprises, simplifying the financing of R&D, and fusing separate research and production units into single administrative entities. But these were piecemeal changes in the apparatus of central planning, and most of them achieved only marginal benefits. Thanks to a regressive price structure, the heightened stress on enterprise profits actually reduced the rate of product innovation.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, most of these measures were not coordinated with choices about the specific Western technologies that the regime acquired. As a result, the Soviet Union's chances to leapfrog the West by combining Western technology with domestic innovation were not enhanced.<sup>14</sup>

#### RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFERS

Since 1980, when the United States responded to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by seeking tighter restrictions on Western technology transfers to the U.S.S.R., the regime has become more apprehensive about its technological weaknesses and more willing to discuss far-reaching reforms that might remedy those weaknesses. Such schemes for reform, however, face powerful domestic opposition, and even if they are implemented they will take a long time to bear fruit. Meanwhile, Soviet leaders will probably continue to regard Western technology as a useful source of economic benefits. But they will probably also be cautious about any major expansion of Soviet reliance on Western inputs.

Experience has tempered the regime's initial optimism about the size of the economic gains that Western technology can bring. Further, although recent Western sanctions against the Soviet Union have done little serious economic damage, they have provoked latent Soviet anxieties about dependence on the capi-

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 211.

<sup>13</sup>Julian Cooper, "Innovation for Innovation in Soviet Industry," in Amann and Cooper, *op. cit.*, pp. 453–513; Parrott, *Politics and Technology*, chapter 5.

<sup>14</sup>Thane Gustafson, *Selling the Russians the Rope? Soviet Technology Policy and U.S. Export Controls* (Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand Corporation, 1981).

<sup>15</sup>International Trade Commission, United States Department of Commerce, *Quantification of Western Exports of High Technology Products to Communist Countries* (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Commerce, 1983), pp. 12–13.

<sup>16</sup>Ellen L. Frost and Angela E. Stent, "NATO's Troubles with East-West Trade," *International Security*, summer, 1983, pp. 179–200.

talist world. So has the crisis in Poland, where the West's substantial economic leverage has created long-term constraints on the Polish government's freedom of action. These circumstances have convinced some Soviet policymakers that the Soviet Union should not increase its own political vulnerability through wider trade with the West.

The past American efforts to use technological "carrots" and "sticks" to shape Soviet political behavior have not been entirely without effect. In the early 1970's, for example, the Brezhnev administration allowed many Soviet Jews to emigrate, and it seems evident that one motive for this unusual step was to obtain greater access to United States technology by placating an aroused American public. On the whole, however, the political results of American economic blandishments and punishments have been extremely limited.

To begin with, Soviet leaders have vigorously resisted accepting any overt linkage between trade and their own conduct. In addition, United States policy has been inconsistent; its focus has oscillated between the Soviet regime's domestic and foreign behavior, and it has tried to elicit major Soviet concessions in exchange for relatively small amounts of technology. Finally, most of the Western technology exported to the Soviet Union has not come from the United States (in contrast to Western exports of agricultural goods). The American share of Western high technology exports to the Soviet Union was only 13.3 percent in 1974 and by 1979 had declined to a mere 6.5 percent.<sup>15</sup> Many other Western nations supplying such technology are reluctant to attach political conditions to East-West trade, and this has worked to the Soviet Union's advantage. President Ronald Reagan's unsuccessful effort to block European technical assistance for construction of the Soviet gas pipeline to West Europe is a vivid example.

In the future, Western technology might conceivably become a more useful instrument for influencing Soviet conduct if the members of the Western alliance were able to move toward agreement on more stable and consistent criteria governing the provision of technical assistance to the Soviet Union. To approach this goal, however, will require more give-and-take among NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) members and a much greater American willingness to sacrifice lucrative grain deals with the Soviet Union when asking the Europeans and Japanese to cut back their trade with the U.S.S.R. in high technology.<sup>16</sup>

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**Bruce Parrott** is the author of *Politics and Technology in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983) and *Information Transfer in Soviet Science and Engineering: A Study of Documentary Channels* (Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand Corporation, 1981).

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*"The basic fact to be kept in mind in evaluating the Soviet Union . . . is that the selection of a successor to Brezhnev, namely, Andropov, who himself is seriously ill, makes all judgments about the mid-1980's extremely difficult and unrealiable. The relatively slow pace of change to date may represent anything from immobilism in the system to the illness of the General Secretary; and these explanations imply radically different predictions for the future."*

## Soviet Politics Under Andropov

BY JERRY F. HOUGH

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**A**s the Andropov "administration" entered its ninth month, major questions remained about its inner character and its future development. Some Western observers viewed Soviet leader Yuri Andropov as a neo-Stalinist placed in power by a KGB-military coup; others originally saw him as a liberal with a Western life-style. While the more extreme views have essentially been proven wrong, even the basic nature of the General Secretary's philosophy cannot be demonstrated conclusively.

In many respects, Andropov's consolidation of power seems to have been swift by historical standards. His major rival, Konstantin Chernenko, had been in overall charge of personnel selection for four or five years before President Leonid Brezhnev's death. And an apparent Chernenko protégé, Vladimir Dolgikh, had been elected a candidate member of the Politburo in the spring of 1982 and had been made the Central Committee secretary in charge of the economy. Almost immediately, Chernenko was moved to a less sensitive slot in charge of ideology and relations with foreign Communists, while Dolgikh was returned to his old responsibilities for heavy industry alone. (A newly elected Central Committee secretary, Nikolai Ryzhkov, handled economic coordination, a fact that was dramatized when he was named head of a new economic department of the Central Committee or, more accurately, of a renamed planning and financial organs department.)

The pattern of appointments also seemed to strengthen Andropov's hand. Geidar Aliev, the Azerbaijani first secretary (but previously a professional KGB officer who had served under Andropov's supervision), became the first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. Aliev thus probably became the dominant force in the Council of Ministers, because its chairman, Nikolai Tikhonov, will be 78 years old this year and was never a major political figure. The head of the KGB, Nikolai Fedorchuk, became head of the regular police (the MVD), replacing a man from Chernenko's Moldavia. The new KGB chairman, Victor

Chebrikov, had been one of Andropov's deputies in the KGB.

While Andropov's involvement was dramatically visible in these KGB appointments, the pattern of middle-level appointments suggested that in the early months Andropov was primarily using old acquaintances and ties in the party apparatus as his main base of power. He had lived in the provincial town of Rybinsk, Yaroslavl, in the mid-1930's with Andrei Kirilenko, who was for years the key figure in the Central Committee Secretariat under Brezhnev until he fell into disgrace as Chernenko rose. Andropov essentially rehabilitated Kirilenko, even letting him walk with the leadership at the Supreme Soviet session in June, 1983. But more important, he appointed many men who seemed part of the old Kirilenko political machine. Nikolai Ryzhkov and Viktor Chebrikov fit within this pattern, and three other prominent examples were the new first secretary of Belorussia, the head of the organizational-party (cadres) department of the Central Committee, and the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Republic.

The first months after Brezhnev's death were also marked by signs of impending policy change. In foreign policy, Andropov broke with tradition by meeting with non-Communist foreign leaders at Brezhnev's funeral, including a half-hour talk with the Chinese foreign minister. In the disarmament field, he made a rather striking proposal with respect to the impasse over the European deployment by the United States of intermediate-range nuclear Pershing and cruise missiles; he offered to reduce the number of SS-20's to the number of the British and French nuclear missiles aimed at the Soviet Union. He met with a delegation of moderate Arab leaders, including King Hussein of Jordan and the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia. There were rumors of a Soviet willingness to compromise on a withdrawal from Afghanistan.

In addition, the middle-level foreign policy appointments showed a preference for Americanists over Europeanists that seemed to augur well for détente.

Other steps indicated a strong repudiation of the Slavophile, Russian nationalist tendency in Russian intellectual life. In February, Andropov wrote a long article on Karl Marx and, in doing so, identified himself with the figure who in Soviet Aesopian debates was the symbol of Western influence on Russia and of Russia's ties to the Western intellectual tradition. Marx was a German Jew, and Russian xenophobes had always downplayed him in comparison with the Russian precursors of Lenin. Soviet leaders had also treated him gingerly.

Then in May or June, Andropov approved the appointment of a new director of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), the country's leading international institute. He chose an Americanist, A. N. Iakovlev, for this European-oriented slot (indeed, Iakovlev was in the first group of exchange students to the United States in 1958–1959); as first deputy head of the propaganda department of the Central Committee, Iakovlev had also been exiled to the ambassadorship in Canada in 1973 immediately after he had written an article criticizing Russian chauvinism.

In the economic sphere, Andropov spoke frankly. He acknowledged that he himself had no ready answers, but he indicated that change was needed. He spoke out in favor of the politically sensitive preconditions for serious economic reform—price equilibrium (that is, a rise in important consumer prices) and a reversal of the policy of egalitarianism. He called for tighter discipline and took several dramatic measures to show that he was serious.

During this period the Soviet press carried articles implying that reform was imminent. Indeed, in agriculture, the Politburo sponsored a system of contracts with small groups of collective farmers—groups that ranged in size but that could be as small as the family and sometimes were.<sup>1</sup> The regime published a draft law on the work collective that seemed to suggest the possibility of real movement toward more worker self-management.

#### SLOWING OF REFORM

In the spring, however, some of the gathering momentum seemed to dissipate. The discipline campaign lessened in intensity. While 9 of 84 Soviet ministers and chairmen of the state committees were retired or removed between November, 1982, and August, 1983, only 10 of 148 regional party first secretaries were replaced, and 5 of these actions were taken because the incumbent had been promoted. The minister of internal affairs and the first secretary of the Krasnodar

territorial party committee were even removed from the Central Committee, but no republican ministers of internal affairs were replaced, and the Krasnodar local newspaper revealed no anticorruption campaign or significant replacement of personnel. In general, there was no evidence of significant dismissals of lower party or government officials, let alone of workers.

Economic reform also moved forward very slowly. The law on the work collective remained extremely vague and was not supplemented by any concrete directives that would increase the rights of workers in management. Collective and state farm managers continued to complain that they themselves "are not in a position to decide independently a single important question for the farm" and that plans are imposed from above<sup>2</sup>; this certainly means that farm managers could not grant any real independence to the family units.

In foreign policy, agreement in disarmament talks seemed as far away in July, 1983, as it had been in November, 1982. Improvements in Soviet relations with China came slowly, and the Soviet commitment to victory in Afghanistan seemed stronger than ever. In the Middle East, the Soviet Union seemed locked into support for the Syrian position. No efforts were made to break away from the obsessive secrecy that bred enormous suspicion of the Soviet Union abroad.

The strangest situation prevailed in the composition of the inner core of the leadership. At a time when the General Secretary was talking about discipline and about urgency in making decisions on economic reform, the Politburo did not have an active chairman of the Council of Ministers but the 78-year-old Tikhonov. Throughout the spring it did not have a Politburo member who supervised the nonagricultural economy, and at least until late spring it did not have a Politburo member who supervised personnel selection.

At least if Soviet rumors in Moscow were correct, the much-awaited June plenary session of the Central Committee did little to move the country forward. A number of usually reliable signs indicated that Mikhail Gorbachev had assumed overall responsibility for personnel selection as well as for the agro-industrial complex. At the plenum, Georgii Romanov, the first secretary of the Leningrad regional party committee, was elected a Central Committee secretary, and one would have assumed that he would fill the empty slot of economic coordinator on the Politburo. Rumors from what should have been authoritative sources, however, claimed that Gorbachev did not have responsibility for personnel and that Romanov was only going to supervise a branch of industry—presumably the defense industry—and would not coordinate the activity of Vladimir Dolgikh and Ryzhkov, the Central Committee secretaries for heavy industry and the planning of the economy. (Some rumors suggested that Romanov

<sup>1</sup>It is possible to find articles in the Soviet press that explicitly describe contracts with family groups and that advocate this pattern as ideal. For example, see *Sovetskaya Kirgizia*, April 8, 1983, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup>*Kommunist* (Erevan), May 19, 1983, p. 2.

would supervise the military as well as the defense industry.) Romanov went on vacation for a month after the plenum, but when he returned he did not attend a major economic planning session with the top Hungarian leaders, and hence the rumors about him at least seemed accurate.

Whatever happened to Gorbachev and Romanov in the late spring, the June plenum added no new voting members to the Politburo and only one candidate member, the new chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.). Although the first secretary of Belorussia has always been elected a candidate member in the last quarter of a century, the new Belorussian party first secretary did not receive this honor. With the death of Arvid Pelshe in May, 1983, the voting membership of the Politburo stood at 11, the lowest number in decades.

The speeches and decisions of the June, 1983, plenum were also relatively innocuous. Andropov was given the chairmanship of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, but this was a ceremonial post and did little more than confirm that he was continuing to consolidate his power. The plenum itself dealt with ideological questions, and the big "news" was the announcement of an intention to replace the Nikita Khrushchev party program of 1961 with a new one. Andropov's discussion of the subject, however, seemed to suggest that the most significant changes in the program would be a removal of some of the more utopian clauses that had long since been repudiated by Brezhnev in any case.

Ideological plenums usually tend to have a conservative tone, and this one was no different in its discussion of the arts. Yet, the speeches were very general, and the literary group that was specifically, if indirectly, criticized was the *derevenchiki*—a group of Russian Slavophilistic writers who have glorified the peasants and the pre-industrial way of life. Hence even in its more critical sections the plenum marked another step in the repudiation of extreme Russian nationalism.

Moreover, Moscow reports indicated that the plenum actually had the paradoxical consequence of loosening some of the restrictions on innovative books and movies. In the months before the meeting, many editors and officials had become cautious, fearing that the plenum might be harsh and that they might be caught in an exposed position. The mildness of the plenum suggested "business as usual," and thus some of the work that had been temporarily postponed apparently began to move again.

If the plenum was relatively traditional in the realm of the arts, the speeches of Chernenko and Andropov were much more forthcoming as far as the social scientists were concerned. Two of the most innovative institutes of the late 1960's—the Central Mathematical

Economic Institute and the Institute of Sociology—had had a very difficult time in the 1970's because of regime pressure. Now they were specifically criticized by Chernenko for the low quality of their work, and, by implication, this reversed the Brezhnev policy toward them. Sociological and economic research and policy advocacy were strongly supported, and the institutes studying the outside world were instructed to given additional attention to the study of foreign experience.

While Chernenko had said that there were certain "generally recognized truths" that could not be challenged, his speech and especially Andropov's speech emphasized the fact that the leadership did not understand the best way to organize the economy—"the laws of the socialist economy." This meant that there were few "generally recognized truths" in one of the most important realms. In addition, the support of sociological research and opinion polling was coupled with statements about the need for the party to be responsive to public opinion.

The regime's acknowledgment of uncertainty about what should be done and the type of economic reform to introduce, even after eight months in office, gave little reason to expect rapid reform. This impression was confirmed six weeks after the plenum when a Central Committee-Council of Ministers decision on economic reform decreed experiments in only a few branches of the economy—and then to begin only in January, 1984. No steps were taken in the areas of trade and services—where the decisions were technically easier but politically difficult because they required an increase in crucial consumer goods prices.

#### WHAT IS HAPPENING?

The crucial question, of course, is what is happening? Why did the early hints and signals not lead to more significant action? Above all, why has Andropov been slow in restructuring the Politburo and especially (if the rumors are true) in creating an inner core of Politburo members to handle domestic decisions?

Broadly speaking, there are several possible answers. One answer is that the core of the Andropov leadership and even Andropov himself may be extremely conservative. From the first days after Brezhnev's death, Roy Medvedev, a semidissident in Moscow with whom Western journalists have frequent contact, has been asserting that Dmitri Ustinov, the Minister of Defense, is the power behind the throne and that Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko is the other member of the inner core. These men in their mid-seventies, who have held very high posts in the government since World War II, are scarcely the most likely candidates to be pushing for reform. One could contend that Andropov must share the views of Ustinov and Gromyko in order to have selected them or else that the military had unusual power at the time of the suc-

sion (this is Medvedev's view) and that Andropov has little leeway, regardless of his own intentions.

Another hypothetical answer is that the surface indications accurately reflect the reality of the situation. In this view, Andropov is generally a reformer—and certainly not a Russian chauvinist—but that he is honest when he says that he does not know what to do. Soviet intellectuals now speak in metaphors in discussing reform: "You can only turn a large ship around slowly"; "If you try to take a train around a curve too quickly, the rear cars may go off the track." This may well be the way that Andropov thinks, and he may still be determined to change the direction of the ship or take the train around the curve.

If this hypothesis is correct, it is likely that Andropov has been moving towards the creation of an inner core of leaders in the domestic policy realm. The signs that Gorbachev has been given general overall supervision of personnel selection are very strong; at a minimum, he is in charge of agriculture, where the leadership is determined to make the first significant reforms. If Romanov does not control the economy as a whole, Ryzhkov may be given broad authority to try to initiate a program of reform in heavy industry. It seems likely that Aliev may be given increasing administrative responsibility—he may well be named chairman of the Council of Ministers—and already a reform is being announced in education, one of his major spheres of responsibility.

A third answer is that Andropov has a reasonably clear sense of the direction in which he wants to go, but that his plan depends on an improvement in relations with the United States. Perhaps because he has not wanted to appear weak in the face of President Ronald Reagan's confrontation posture, Andropov has gone to extraordinary lengths to give the appearance of continuity in foreign policy, even to the extent of retaining Brezhnev's personal assistant for foreign policy. Yet significant economic reform is extremely difficult without détente and a limitation on military expenditures,<sup>3</sup> and major movement on the Chinese front may also be hostage to a decision on the SS-20's in Europe.

As these lines are written, a number of symbolic steps have been taken in Soviet-American relations—a breakthrough at the Madrid Conference, release of the Pentacostal family in the American embassy in Moscow, and a renewal of the wheat agreement. If these are followed by some solution of the Pershing—SS-20 impasse this fall, then there should be a quick-

ening of the pace of decisions in the domestic sphere as well.

A fourth answer is that, while Andropov has done much to consolidate his power, his health has deteriorated so rapidly that he really does not have the energy for significant action. Certainly those foreigners who have watched him closely have testified that his physical condition has deteriorated in the last six months. He has lost weight, and his hand often shakes. When he was elected chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, he did not take the few steps to the rostrum to make his acceptance speech. His June speech to the Central Committee was read for him on television, while Chernenko was personally shown on the evening news giving part of his speech to the same body. When Samantha Smith, the 11-year-old American who had written Andropov, was invited to the Soviet Union in July, her visit received daily Soviet television coverage that was clearly leading to a meeting with the General Secretary. The meeting did not take place, and the only reasonable explanation is Andropov's health.

It is possible that Andropov's health has affected the course of events indirectly as well as directly. If the other Politburo members have the sense that the General Secretary does not have long to live, it is possible that they are resisting any additions to the Politburo for fear that this will affect a new succession that has already been decided. It is possible that reform is being postponed so that a new General Secretary can put his stamp on his own program.

Although it seems perverse to be talking about the next succession when Andropov has been in office for less than a year, this is probably a subject to which we should be giving increasing attention. Roy Medvedev has been arguing that Minister of Defense Ustinov is the strongest potential successor.<sup>4</sup> Others believe that Chernenko is leading a coalition of the party apparatus against Andropov and that he might be the successor.

In fact, neither of these scenarios is at all convincing. Of the four hypothetical explanations for the events of the last eight months, only the first seems improbable.<sup>5</sup> While Ustinov was highly visible at Brezhnev's funeral, he has had a rather low profile since then, and there has not been any visible evidence that he is in the inner core. Indeed, in March, Andrei Gromyko was given the post of first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers in addition to his foreign ministry—a status that might well have been given to the

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<sup>3</sup>For a discussion of this question, see Jerry F. Hough, "Soviet Succession: Issues and Personalities," *Problems of Communism*, September-October, 1982, pp. 21-27.

<sup>4</sup>This view was expressed most forcefully in an interview published in *Corriers Della Sar*, June 26, 1983.

<sup>5</sup>My feeling is that the correct answer is to be found in a combination of the other three.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

### ON THE SOVIET UNION

**USSR IN CRISIS: THE FAILURE OF AN ECONOMIC SYSTEM.** By *Marshall I. Goldman*. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983. 210 pages, tables, notes, bibliography and index, \$15.00.)

Since the mid-1970's, the Soviet economy has experienced increasingly acute problems. Goldman does not attribute the decline in gross national product, agricultural production, labor productivity and so on to any short-term factors but to the failure of the Stalinist model of the centrally planned economy. Arguing that the model has outlived its usefulness because of its emphasis on heavy industry and centralized planning, he assesses the possibilities of a major structural change in the system. The pessimistic conclusions he reaches—that short-term reforms will not be enough and that any major reforms will probably trigger political unrest—are not meant to reassure those who would see in this the dissolution of the Soviet Union; they do point up the severe domestic difficulties facing the Soviet Union in the next 20 years.

W.W.F.

**THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION IN THE SOVIET UNION.** By *Erik P. Hoffman and Robbin F. Laird*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982. 215 pages, notes and index, \$19.50.)

**THE SCIENTIFIC-TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY.** By *Erik P. Hoffman and Robbin F. Laird*. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982. 242 pages, notes and index, \$29.50.)

The need to make changes in the Soviet economy has not gone unnoticed in the Soviet Union. According to Hoffman and Laird, two factions have developed: the conservatives, who advocate a return to the confines of the Stalinist model of rigid discipline and autarkic development, and the modernizers, who see the need to decentralize economic planning and management and integrate the Soviet economy into the world economy. *The Politics of Economic Modernization* is a study of the ideas of the two camps; *The Scientific-Technological Revolution and Soviet Foreign Policy* is a rigorous examination of the worldwide "scientific-technological revolution" and its effect on Soviet foreign policy.

W.W.F.

**STUDIES IN FREE RUSSIA.** By *Franco Venturi*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. 300 pages, notes and index, \$27.50.)

This volume of translated essays will be of interest

to those who want to trace the connections between European thought and the development of the Russian intelligentsia (especially "Russians, French and Italians"). There is also a translation of Venturi's long introduction to the second edition of his book on Russian populism that underscores the importance of that movement to the revolution. W.W.F.

**THE GREAT GAME: RIVALRY IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND SOUTH ASIA.** Edited by *Alvin Z. Rubinstein*. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. 288 pages and index, \$25.95.)

This collection of original essays focuses on one of the key regions of the third world. It is the first book-length study to analyze the strategic and political implications of key developments in the Persian Gulf and South Asia since the late 1970's and to assess their implications for the area as a whole and for United States-Soviet rivalry. The ten authors have written thoughtful, well-researched chapters, which make for a stimulating policy analysis. O.E.S.

**DANGEROUS RELATIONS: THE SOVIET UNION IN WORLD POLITICS, 1970-1982.** By *Adam Ulam*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. 325 pages, notes and index, \$25.00.)

A thorough history of Soviet foreign policy in the last decade, Ulam sees the Soviet Union's actions during President Leonid Brezhnev's tenure as increasingly aggressive and expansionist. This forcefulness stems from the Soviet leadership's belief "that its internal security is inextricably bound up with the advance of its external power and authority. . . . For the [Russian] people at large, Russia's greatness and power in world affairs are . . . compensation for the failure of other promises of Communism. . . ." O.E.S.

**THE SOVIET UNION AND THE THIRD WORLD.** By *Elizabeth Valkenier*. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. 188 pages, bibliography and index, \$23.95.)

This study examines the changing Soviet interpretations of economic developments in the third world. Through an exhaustive and illuminative analysis of Soviet writings, the author traces the growing sophistication in Soviet developmental theory. As a result, "Moscow has become disenchanted with the feasibility of 'socialist' remedies. . . ."

Alvin Z. Rubinstein  
University of Pennsylvania

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## THE SOVIET APPROACH TO WEST EUROPE

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what they contend is the global adventurism of the United States.

Moscow, for example, has reiterated its preference for a nuclear-free zone in Europe. This history of this idea goes back to 1957, when Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki proposed the complete removal and non-use of nuclear weapons in Central Europe—that is, in West Germany on the NATO side, and East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia on the Warsaw Pact side. The unequal depth of the military blocs, combined with the superior conventional forces of the U.S.S.R., precluded serious consideration of this idea. But it surfaced again recently when Moscow endorsed in principle the Swedish proposal for a nuclear-free strip along the East-West dividing line in Europe.

The Swedish government's intention was to lessen the danger of nuclear escalation in the event of a conventional military conflict in Europe. It suggested that both sides move their "battlefield" nuclear weapons 150 kilometers away from the demarcation line to eliminate the "use them or lose them" dilemma. This, it was hoped, would raise the nuclear threshold and offer greater chances for a peaceful solution in the event of a mistake or an accident. The proposal was not intended to alter the balance of power between the two blocs, only to reduce the danger of a nuclear war in Europe.

Soviet leaders responded promptly and positively. But they twisted the entire objective of the Swedish plan by demanding that the nuclear-free zone should be broadened to a width 250-300 kilometers from the demarcation line. In the Soviet version, all of West Germany would thus be included in the nuclear-free zone, exposing it to Soviet intimidation because Soviet conventional forces would no longer be restrained by the nuclear threat. This would profoundly decrease American ability to defend West Europe and would be a major step toward breaking United States-West European security links. In effect, the Soviet Union rejected the idea of a European zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons. Moscow is not interested in cosmetic changes, but in obtaining a breakthrough in the strategic stalemate.

The same overall purpose of removing the West's nuclear deterrent from the borders of Soviet military influence inspired Moscow's attempts to convince the smaller countries on the northern and southern flanks of the continent to support a nuclear-free zone. Soviet leaders argue that in some cases such a zone is already a reality. It ought to be given official recognition, they say, in the form of an international treaty banning the manufacture, transshipment, or deployment of nuclear arms in the area. Soviet propaganda depicts nu-

clear-free zones as "oases of security" in Europe. The Soviet plan was endorsed early this year by the Prague Declaration of the Warsaw Pact states.

For their part, Soviet leaders are willing to contribute to the zone an unspecified portion of their own territory or the territory of their allies and assume an obligation not to use nuclear weapons against the signatories "under any circumstances" and "without exception." This unusual bit of Soviet generosity indicates Moscow's confidence in the ability of its conventional forces to master the military and political situation once the nuclear deterrence of the West is removed. The Soviet Union views the proposal as being in the best interest of the national security of all the countries involved, since they would no longer be "nuclear hostages" of the United States, which is now maneuvering to spread nuclear weapons around West Europe.

The threat to West Europe, the Soviets insist, is exclusively the result of an American policy by which the West European states are used as military bases, springboards for aggression against the socialist community. Instead of assuming this distasteful and subservient role, Soviet leaders say, the nations of West Europe should enjoy the benefits of neutrality and a policy of confidence, friendship and mutually beneficial economic cooperation between states with different social systems. Moscow loudly advertised this model of peaceful coexistence between a small state and its powerful Russian neighbor on the recent occasion of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the U.S.S.R. and Finland. "Finlandization" is for the Soviet Union the ideal status for West Europe.

Finlandization is meant to convey the idea of pro-Soviet "neutrality" in foreign affairs and at home a certain pluralism based on Western values and political systems. Freedom of action is limited by a prevailing self-censorship under pressure from powerful and omnipresent pro-Soviet pressure groups especially influential in the government and the media. Under the rules of the game, Soviet interests must receive careful consideration, since the country has no political-military resources to counter preponderant Soviet power. For its national security, Finland is entirely dependent on Moscow's good will. Its structure of foreign trade bears a strong resemblance to that of the Soviet-bloc states which depend on the Soviets for raw materials, including energy, and the markets of their Eastern neighbor.

If extended to West Europe, this model of coexistence with the Soviet Union would involve the atomization of the Western alliance. All supranational political-military structures would be replaced by treaties of friendship and cooperation with the U.S.S.R. Such

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## SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS: THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE

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icymakers to fall prey to worst-case analyses and to embrace the most menacing theories concerning Soviet willingness to initiate nuclear war, Soviet designs on West Europe or a Soviet master plan for seizing the Persian Gulf. Soviet suspiciousness inhibits frank and constructive communication between the superpowers and makes it difficult for Western policymakers to know what the Kremlin's anxieties and priorities are and what trade-offs they are prepared to accept.

A deeply ingrained sense of insecurity causes the Soviet regime to adopt a stance of combative assertiveness and to take unilateral steps that threaten the security of others. Such actions as the massive Soviet military buildup of the past 15 years and the occupation of Afghanistan may have been motivated in large measure by Soviet insecurity and the desire to be safe from present or future threats. But the magnitude of these Soviet moves—coupled with the absence of any convincing explanation of their true intent—only frightens other states and spurs them to take countermeasures of their own, which in the end only heighten the Soviet perceptions of threat and encirclement.

Ideological factors are far less important in motivating contemporary Soviet foreign policy than they were in Joseph Stalin's day, yet they still play an unhelpful role. The lingering influence of the Marxist-Leninist worldview colors Soviet perception and reinforces its historically based sense of insecurity. It also predisposes the Soviet leadership to reject notions of a stable balance of power and international equilibrium in favor of an outlook emphasizing the inevitability of a bitter, unrelenting struggle between two supposedly irreconcilable forces—socialism and capitalism. Western policies are viewed in the worst possible light, and all sorts of elaborate plots and conspiracies are imagined where none exist. At the same time, Soviet self-righteousness—the refusal ever to acknowledge past Soviet errors and contributions to international tension—makes it harder for Western policymakers to believe that the Soviet Union is capable of change and that the superpowers can find a new, more constructive basis for their relationship.

Paradoxically, to the extent that the Soviet sense of ideological self-confidence has actually weakened in the past two decades, the Soviet Union has become more—rather than less—difficult to deal with. The continued vitality of the Western world combined with severe setbacks to Soviet expectations (like the split with China, the disintegration of the Communist party in Poland, the successful resistance of third world countries to long-term Soviet influence, gains, and a severe drop in the rate of growth of the Soviet economy) have shaken the Politburo's confidence that the

forward march of history and the supposed superiority of Soviet-type economies will inevitably lead to capitalism's demise. Unable to rely on the ideological or economic appeal of the Soviet system, its leaders have concentrated on the one reliable element of power over which they have some direct control—military power.

Unfortunately, vast military power and a sense of genuine security are two very different things. As of the early 1980's, Soviet power, both in absolute terms and relative to that of the United States, is greater than at any other time in the nuclear age. But this has not brought the regime corresponding gains in security, and the leadership is now far less confident of the future than it was under Khrushchev or during the early days of Brezhnev. Thus an increasingly nervous Soviet Union now confronts a United States that is alarmed by growing Soviet military strength. This is a situation fraught with danger and is exceedingly difficult to defuse.

### DIFFERENT VIEWPOINTS

Just as various features of the Soviet political system hinder the search for improved East-West relations, so several distinctive aspects of American politics have the same effect. The system by which presidential candidates are nominated and elected has in recent years produced a rapid succession of individuals with relatively little experience in foreign affairs. The first part of the President's four-year term is often occupied by the newly elected individual's on-the-job training, his attempts to come to terms with the conflicts and tensions within the foreign policy bureaucracy, and his efforts to decide just how to deal with the Russians. If the President is seeking reelection, the last part of his term is devoted to campaigning and efforts to fashion a synthetic image that will appeal to an electorate that is not very sophisticated about the intricacies of international politics.

This situation is further complicated by the volatility and impatience of American public opinion. Americans have a tendency to become too optimistic and euphoric during intervals of cordial East-West relations and too pessimistic and fatalistic during periods of acute international tension. Just as American public opinion was uncomfortable with the limited wars fought in Korea and Vietnam, feeling that the United States should either make a no-holds-barred effort to win the struggle or else get out altogether, so too there is unhappiness with the idea of a long-term political relationship that contains a mixture of cooperative and conflictual elements. The thought is often expressed that if the Soviet Union is "the enemy," then Americans should not be trading with Soviet citizens; and if the Soviet Union is not "the enemy," why must so much money be spent on nuclear weapons? Similarly, people find it hard to believe that the United States,

with all its vast power, can do relatively little to alter the Soviet system and make it more humane and democratic.

Many Americans also have an unrealistic conception of superpower rivalry in the third world. They demand not only that Moscow cease its efforts to expand beyond its borders, but also that the Soviet Union refrain from using many of the interventionist methods employed so often by the United States. By minimizing indigenous sources of instability and underestimating the strength of nationalism throughout the third world, the hand of Moscow is all too often perceived where it in fact has little influence.

The growing divergence between American and West European perspectives on détente has become an important source of division within NATO. Although European opinion is far from unanimous, on the whole Europeans tend to take a more balanced and long-term view of their relations with the Soviet Union. Schooled by centuries of war and turmoil, they have a much more modest conception of the degree to which Western policies can ameliorate the authoritarian features of the Soviet system. Yet at the same time, they are more hopeful that instances of East-West antagonism need not stand in the way of meaningful cooperation in those areas where there are common interests. Whereas many in the United States now dismiss détente as a "one-way street" whose benefits are believed to flow only eastward, Europeans value the limited gains that were made during the 1970's in stabilizing the situation in Europe, ending the dangerous confrontation over West Berlin, opening up cultural, scientific and economic ties between the two camps, facilitating an unprecedented degree of emigration from the Soviet bloc, and creating opportunities for the eventual negotiation of arms control agreements. Thus while influential voices within the administration of President Reagan believe that there is relatively little to be gained from talking to the Russians, many European policymakers are eager to keep the East-West dialogue going.

## CONCLUSION

The dynamics of Soviet-American interaction explain in part why East-West relations have experienced such a dramatic cycle of boom and bust over the years. Single cause explanations—like the often heard argument that détente comes about only when the Soviet

<sup>5</sup>Soviet perspectives are examined in: Alexander Dallin, "The United States in Soviet Perspective," *Adelphi Papers*, no. 151 (1979), pp. 13–21; Robert Legvold, "The 26th Party Congress and Soviet Foreign Policy," in Seweryn Bialer and Thane Gustafson, eds., *Russia at the Crossroads* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 156–177; Paul Marantz, "Changing Soviet Conceptions of East-West Relations," *International Journal*, vol. 37, no. 2 (spring, 1982), pp. 220–240; Morton Schwartz, *Soviet Perceptions of the United States* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

regime feels weak and ends as soon as it is ready to shift to more advantageous tactics—do not do justice to the complexity of the many factors involved. Indeed, far from cynically manipulating Western policy, there is much evidence that the top Soviet leadership, both under Khrushchev (in 1959–1960) and Brezhnev (in the early 1970's), was very much surprised and disappointed by its inability to bring about a fundamental and long-term improvement in Soviet-American relations. At the height of détente in the early 1970's, Soviet spokesmen were every bit as enthusiastic in hailing the forthcoming "fundamental restructuring of international relations" as United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was in calling for a new structure of peace and a new era of negotiations.<sup>5</sup>

Given the present low point in Soviet-American relations, perhaps there is limited consolation in the pendulum swings of the past. Over the years, major changes have often come about with dramatic suddenness, and frequently the fears provoked by a sharp deterioration of relations have served as an impetus to new efforts to lessen the danger of war. The Korean War of the early 1950's, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 all constituted low points in Soviet-American relations that were quickly followed by an unexpectedly rapid upturn. The nuclear jitters of the early 1980's may yet produce the same result.

However, it is also crucial to remember that each of these periods of limited détente soon came to a disappointing end. Unless policymakers in Washington and Moscow can find the vision and the creativity needed to grapple with and transcend the divisive elements in their relations, any future détente is likely to be as temporary and as barren of truly lasting significance as its predecessors. ■

## AFGHANISTAN

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unwillingness of the Pakistani government to accept Babrak Karmal as the legitimate head of the Afghan government, because it is convinced that the Mujahideen will not deal with him, and because without their cooperation no meaningful agreement can be implemented.

The Pakistanis very much desire a settlement that would rid them of the refugees, who are a major drain on their scarce resources and who increasingly threaten to aggravate social and ethnic tensions to a degree that could seriously destabilize the strategically important NWFP area of Pakistan. The government fears that the world community is losing interest in the refugees, and the burden for their upkeep is falling unfairly on Pakistan, which foots the bill for more than 50 percent of the approximately \$600 million a year necessary to feed and house (in tents) the more than three million refugees. Even fellow Islamic countries

have been less than generous, either because they have little sense of affinity with the Afghans or because of other priorities.

The Pakistanis also recognize the essence of the Soviet dilemma, namely, the longer they occupy the country, the more they will alienate the Afghan people, and the more difficult it will then become for the Soviets to pull out without fear that a bitterly hostile government will come to power in Kabul.

Pakistan's intimate involvement in the ongoing discussions and its profound stake in the outcome makes it a much-watched weather vane. In late May, during a visit to Washington, Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan reportedly told Secretary of State George Shultz that Soviet leaders had hinted at a readiness to withdraw from Afghanistan if the government in Kabul "could be replaced by one that was friendly to the Russians but not necessarily under Soviet control." A week later, Pakistani President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq was quoted as saying that the Soviets have been taking a "very positive approach" in the United Nations talks in Geneva and "perhaps they are keen to withdraw . . . if the conditions are right."

Like a number of Western analysts, Pakistani officials maintain that the Geneva talks cannot be dismissed as merely cosmetic. They believe (perhaps because hope requires that they see the possibility of a felicitous outcome) that Moscow wants to find a face-saving way out, though the time is not yet at hand to assess fully what that would entail.

Moscow's options are limited. First, it could withdraw, using the United Nations talks to obtain a settlement that would call for a conciliatory, but not necessarily Communist, government in Kabul (in a sense, this would be a return to the situation that existed before the April, 1978, coup). According to Selig Harrison, a thoughtful and prolific writer on South Asian affairs, "Soviet sources" say Moscow seeks a "friendly government." This would be one that

would recognize the continued need for Soviet military advisers in Afghanistan, as well as large-scale Soviet economic aid, despite the withdrawal of Soviet forces under the United Nations agreement. Soviet technical personnel would be required to help keep the Afghan military communications system in operation and to make sure that airfields and other installations are in repair. Given the continuing danger of American military intervention in Iran, these sources have observed, Soviet forces might well have to return to Afghanistan at some point. Kabul should therefore be prepared to grant Moscow some form of military base rights, possibly patterned after the Porkkala naval base precedent in Finland.<sup>8</sup>

Assuming that Moscow really wants to withdraw and is prepared to be flexible, it should be willing to accept somewhat less—a treaty establishing Afghanistan's

<sup>8</sup>Selig S. Harrison, "A Breakthrough in Afghanistan?" *Foreign Policy*, no. 51 (summer, 1983), p. 13.

permanent military neutrality along the lines adopted by Austria in October, 1955, as the price for independence and a withdrawal of Soviet and Western forces from the country.

A graceful way could be devised for getting rid of Babrak Karmal, holding internationally supervised elections, and overseeing a phased but speedy Soviet military withdrawal. Moscow would be implicitly acknowledging a past blunder, but would cut its losses and open the way for better relations with the Muslim countries of the region, notably, Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. And this might also help put the United States-Soviet relationship back on a détente track.

A second option would be to negotiate a Soviet military withdrawal in return for acceptance of the pro-Soviet Communist regime of Babrak Karmal and safeguards that would enable Moscow to send troops back to forestall "foreign intervention." This presupposes that Moscow would not abandon a Communist regime; that the price for a removal of Soviet troops and an end to the threat they pose to countries in the region is the regional and international recognition of the Babrak Karmal regime.

The final option is the continued Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan and the institutionalizing of Communist rule. In this case, the Kremlin's long-term aim would be to transform Afghanistan into another Mongolia: nominally independent, but Communist in character and completely subordinate to the Soviet Union in matters of defense and foreign policy, with a substantial Soviet military presence as an integral feature of the relationship. Control of Afghanistan gives Moscow enormous political and military leverage in the region, and Soviet leaders, whose geostrategic outlook places a high value on prime real estate, may decide that the costs of countering the insurgency are not high enough to warrant relinquishment of the country.

At a conference of Soviet and American scholars held in Washington earlier in 1983, a Soviet participant strongly upheld the Soviet policy in Afghanistan. He told of being asked by a Japanese official why Soviet troops were in Afghanistan and of countering by asking why American troops were in Japan.

"They are here in accordance with the United States-Japan security treaty," said the Japanese official.

"We have a treaty with Afghanistan. And Soviet troops will remain in Afghanistan as long as American troops remain in Japan," was the retort—an unmistakable message for the Americans at the conference. (That no Japanese are killing Americans as the Afghans are killing Russians was a point he chose to ignore.)

In Afghanistan in late 1983, clearly, there is diplomatic activity, but as yet no movement. The Afghan crisis is likely to be with us for a long time to come. ■

## TECHNOLOGY AND THE SOVIET SYSTEM

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### MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

The role of technical assistance in East-West diplomacy also raises the issue of military technology. In the last decade, some Western officials have become convinced that growing transfers of Western know-how are contributing to the steady advancement of Soviet military weaponry. In this view, the current export controls administered under the 1950 CoCom agreement (in which NATO members and Japan agreed on a nonbinding basis to restrict strategic exports to the Communist world) have failed to block this development. Some officials have urged a large expansion of the list of exports prohibited under the CoCom agreement.

With congressional authorization, the United States Defense Department also attempted to devise new ways to restrict the Soviet acquisition of military-related "critical technologies" through active forms of transfer such as Western training of Soviet bloc personnel, extensive contacts among technical specialists, and the like.<sup>17</sup> There can be no doubt that important lapses in the control of weapons-related technologies have occurred. Probably the most serious was the export to the Soviet Union of micro ball bearing grinders that could be used to enhance the accuracy of Soviet missile guidance systems.<sup>18</sup>

The problem is to decide how to obstruct direct Soviet military applications of Western technology, which all the Western allies oppose in principle, without inflicting unacceptable costs on the Western countries themselves. Widening the list of prohibited exports is not the answer. This step could divert attention from control of the most vital military-related technologies and would undermine Western cooperation by exacerbating West European suspicions that the United States is pursuing economic warfare against the Soviet Union rather than trying to control the technology directly applicable to weapons production.

The critical technologies approach also has major drawbacks. In practice, it has proved difficult to apply, and there is a serious danger that it will gradually be expanded to encompass not only Western commercial knowledge but also the findings of unclassified non-commercial research. The effect would be to create obstacles to scientific discussion and communication

<sup>17</sup>The reasoning behind this approach is set out in *An Analysis of Export Control of U.S. Technology—A DOD Perspective* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, 1976).

<sup>18</sup>Gustafson, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-14.

<sup>19</sup>J. Fred Bucy, "Technology Transfer and East-West Trade: A Reappraisal," *International Security*, winter, 1980-1981, p. 140.

within the West that could easily harm the pace of technological development in the United States more than it inhibited the progress of Soviet weaponry.

Rather than move in this direction, the United States government would be wiser to put the emphasis on other measures: increasing the number and expertise of Western officials monitoring commercial flows of technology to the East; urging the Western allies that do not include their defense ministries in decisions on such transfers to do so;<sup>19</sup> and improving Western governments' understanding of the potential military impact of specific transfers by underwriting ongoing, across-the-board study of Soviet manufacturing technologies.

These are only partial solutions. But in dealing with the problem the United States should not weaken its own capacities for technological innovation, which constitute one of the principal American strengths in the long-term competition with the Soviet Union. ■

## ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN THE SOVIET UNION

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For the thoughtful economist in the Soviet Union, this means that if the Soviet Union is to solve its economic problems it must rely on internal reforms, not on an external transfusion of technology. Such recognition will not come easily. No far-reaching economic reform has taken place since the five year plans were originally introduced in the late 1920's. The ramifications of a similarly momentous change today are enormous, and it is unclear if Andropov or even his ultimate successor will be daring and strong enough to oversee such a transformation. ■

## THE SOVIET UNION IN EAST ASIA

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viet leaders for several reasons. Their historically rooted suspicion is aggravated by contemporary developments. Since the late 1970's, the United States and, with more ambivalence, China have encouraged an increase in Japan's military power and role in East Asia. Given the United States military presence in Japan and South Korea and the geopolitical likemindedness of the United States and China since the 1970's, Soviet leaders fear a second front in the Pacific made up of China, Japan, the United States, and South Korea.

This fear is reflected clearly in the Soviet press. The Japanese government's support for revising history textbooks to present the militarism of the 1930's and 1940's in a less sordid light evokes frequent Soviet comment and is interpreted as an effort to prepare Japanese citizens politically and psychologically for rearmament. Increases in Japanese defense spending in 1982 and 1983, despite Japan's emphasis on frugality for most other areas of investment, are regarded

as indications of the influence of right-wing forces in industry and the Self-Defense Forces. And Yasuhiro Nakasone's election as Prime Minister in November, 1982, is seen as additional evidence of the growing influence of Japan's military-industrial complex.

The Soviet Union also sees an increase in cooperation between Japan and the United States on military matters. Tokyo's 1982 decision to begin exporting military technology to the United States is viewed as an effort to supplement American military strength. When Nakasone visited South Korea just before going to the United States and announced that Japan would lend South Korea \$4 billion, Soviet leaders saw it as a successful United States effort to reduce the burden of its military presence in northeast Asia by enlisting Japanese financial support. In the United States, Nakasone spoke of Japan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" that would ward off the Soviet Backfire bomber. He also referred to Japan's role, in the event of war, in blocking the straits through which Soviet ships and submarines based at Vladivostok would have to pass to reach the high seas. The Soviet responses were menacing. A Soviet commentator observed that, "there are no unsinkable aircraft carriers." He added: "To keep afloat, it is essential for Japan not to build up its military strength. . . ."<sup>14</sup>

The decision to station American F-16 fighter bombers at Misawa in Hokkaido after 1985 further stimulated Soviet concern about the growth of United States-Japanese cooperation; the Soviet press noted that the aircraft could carry nuclear weapons and had a range sufficient to attack Vladivostok, Sakhalin and the Kurile islands. But the developments deemed most significant were Japan's participation in the RIMPAC naval exercises—along with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States—in 1980 and 1982, and its decision to assume responsibility for defending the sea lanes 1,000 miles from its shores to compensate for the diversion of vessels from the United States Seventh Fleet to the Persian Gulf.

The depth of concern over Japan often makes Soviet analysts underestimate the difficulties faced by a Japanese government committed to substantial increases in military power. There is general agreement in Japan that the Soviet Union is the major threat in East Asia. But the policies advocated by defense specialists as a response are varied. Some support a vast buildup of Japan's military power, and a few even support the production of nuclear weapons. Others see greater cooperation with the United States on regional security based on the United States-Japanese

security treaty as the keystone of Japan's security. Still others see the Soviet Union as a defensive state preoccupied by the fear of encirclement. To them, receptiveness to Soviet interests and greater economic cooperation with the U.S.S.R. would create a climate of trust, permitting Japan to concentrate on the peaceful pursuit of commerce.

There is what one Japanese defense specialist calls "a hard core of Japanese pacifism."<sup>15</sup> A concern about security is no doubt present in Japan. But so is the conviction that the culmination of Japan's militarism in the 1930's was the horror of nuclear devastation in 1945. Many Japanese also believe that big increases in defense spending will retard economic growth and their rising standard of living. As for the government, a decline in the rate of economic growth in the last two years and a mounting public debt—which, as a percentage of the government budget, exceeds that of all industrialized countries except Britain—mean that hard choices must accompany any commitment to boost the defense budget substantially. Indeed, while Japan's 1982 defense budget grew by 7.75 percent, the 1983 budget grew by 6.5 percent—the smallest increase since 1965.<sup>16</sup>

An important issue over which a rearmed Japan might become more assertive, in the Soviet view, is the status of the Etorofu, Habomais, Kunashiri, and Shikotan islands north of Hokkaido. The Japanese consider these their "Northern Territories," and dispute Moscow's claim that Soviet control of them since the end of World War II rests on a sound legal foundation.

The origins and evolution of the controversy over these Kurile islands are complex, but the contemporary essence is not. During the Khrushchev era, the U.S.S.R. agreed to return Habomais and Shikotan providing two conditions, not always linked, were met: the signing of a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty, and the withdrawal of American military forces from Japan. But in the Brezhnev years the Soviet position stiffened and it remains stiff today. The existence of any territorial dispute is denied, and Japan is urged to sign a treaty of peace and friendship with the U.S.S.R. Any effort to link "intrinsically hopeless demands" to the signing of such a treaty, it is emphasized, is futile. The Soviet Union has also increased its military presence on the islands since 1978 to about 10,000 soldiers. Given the fact that far more Japanese troops are on Hokkaido, this is not a major new threat to Japan. But it is a vivid display of Soviet resoluteness. Because the disputed islands guard the southern entrance to the Sea of Okhotsk, where Soviet strategic nuclear submarines are based, a change in the firm Soviet position is not likely.

Suspicion and disagreement, however, are not the only aspects of recent Soviet-Japanese relations. Trade between the two states has grown from under \$1 mil-

<sup>14</sup>Yuri Tavrovsky, "He Did Not Come Empty Handed," *New Times* (Moscow), no. 5 (January, 1983), p. 13.

<sup>15</sup>Hisahiko Okazaki, "Japanese Security Policy: A Time for Strategy," *International Security*, vol. 7, no. 2, p. 193.

<sup>16</sup>See Mike Tharp, "Japan's Budgetary Bind," *FEER*, January 13, 1983, pp. 38-39.

lion in 1955 to \$3.4 billion in 1979, and Japan's use of Soviet territory as a passageway for trade with Europe has also grown. After being shipped to Soviet ports across the Sea of Japan, Japanese containerized exports to West Europe need be hauled only 13,000 kilometers across the "trans-Siberian landbridge" compared to 21,000 kilometers by sea through the Suez Canal.

The landbridge trade grew from 2,300 containers in 1971 to 80,000 in 1976; the millionth container was transported in 1982.<sup>17</sup> Japan's increasing uneasiness about its dependence on distant and often unstable parts of the world for its raw material needs has made Soviet-Japanese cooperation in the development of Siberia appear attractive. Since 1970, \$3 billion in Japanese credits, along with equipment and advisers, have been given to the U.S.S.R. for a variety of projects in Siberia: the building of a new port at Vostochny; and the exploitation of gas, oil, and timber.<sup>18</sup>

But Soviet-Japanese economic relations have fallen short of Moscow's expectations. The early hopes for vast cooperation in Siberia have been reduced for a number of reasons: the precipitous decline in détente since the late 1970's; Japan's reluctance to increase its dependence on the U.S.S.R. and enter into large business deals with the Soviet Union without United States approval; and the Northern Territories dispute. Soviet leaders lament the intrusion of such political problems into Soviet-Japanese relations and reject what they see as a Japanese effort to use credits and technology as a lever for loosening the Soviet position on the Northern Territories. Japan is reminded that increased Soviet-Japanese trade is mutually advantageous, that Soviet-Japanese trade is complementary and not competitive and that, unlike the West, the U.S.S.R. does not demand from Japan "any 'self-restrictions' or 'opening of the Japanese market.'"<sup>19</sup>

The growth of Soviet-Japanese economic relations could also be limited by China. Since the late 1970's there has been a far stronger geopolitical meeting of minds between Beijing and Tokyo than between Tokyo and Moscow; China's economic relations with Japan have blossomed amidst the withering of détente. Soviet scholars note that Japan's trade with China may also have greater potential because, while the east coast of China is relatively developed, the eastern U.S.S.R.

<sup>17</sup>Zagoria, *op. cit.*, pp. 203, 211.

<sup>18</sup>Details in Rajendra Jain, *The USSR and Japan, 1945-1980* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981), pp. 110-122; Allan S. Whiting, *Siberian Development and East Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), pp. 134-153.

<sup>19</sup>*Pravda*, February 28, 1983, p. 3.

<sup>20</sup>Interview, Moscow, May, 1983.

<sup>21</sup>Gerald L. Curtis, "Japanese Security Policies," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 59, no. 4 (spring, 1983), p. 857.

<sup>22</sup>Bruce W. Watson, *Red Navy at Sea: Soviet Naval Operations on the High Seas, 1956-1980* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1982), pp. 139-140.

is relatively underdeveloped.<sup>20</sup> Whatever the precise reasons, Sino-Japanese trade has grown by an annual average of 29 percent since 1972 and it surpassed Soviet-Japanese trade in 1976.<sup>21</sup> To Soviet leaders this is not only economically worrisome; it also suggests a Japanese interest in building up China's strength to counter the U.S.S.R.

#### SOUTHEAST ASIA: POWER AND ITS COSTS

In Indochina, Soviet military power has been the agent of major change in recent years. In January, 1979, Soviet-equipped Vietnam invaded Kampuchea and replaced the murderous Khmer Rouge government of Pol Pot with one led by Heng Samrin. Pol Pot had been supported by China; Heng Samrin is attuned to the interests of Moscow and Hanoi. China responded with an attack on Vietnam; but although the war was bloody, it was also limited. Beijing was too mindful of Soviet power to embark on a full-scale invasion of Vietnam. Hanoi had signed a security treaty with Moscow in November, 1978, and once the Chinese-Vietnamese war began, two groups of Soviet ships were deployed in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Soviet TU-95 aircraft flew reconnaissance missions and Soviet weapons were sent by air and sea.<sup>22</sup>

These efforts to show that Soviet military power stood behind Vietnam, together with the Soviet military presence along the Chinese border, were adequate to ensure the overthrow of a pro-Chinese government in Kampuchea. Military power has its limits; but it also has its uses.

Four annual United Nations General Assembly resolutions have, with large majorities, been adopted since the Vietnamese invasion. Each has called on Vietnam to leave Kampuchea and has asked for free elections. In 1981, an international conference on Kampuchea made similar suggestions. But Vietnamese troops continue to guard the Heng Samrin government while it tries to strengthen its political authority and revive the exhausted economy.

Battling the 200,000 Vietnamese troops are about 20,000 Khmer Rouge guerrillas. To reduce the likelihood that the people of Kampuchea would conclude that Pol Pot was the alternative to Heng Samrin, an anti-Vietnamese Kampuchean coalition was formed in 1982. It includes the Khmer Rouge led by Khieu Samphan (but Pol Pot still commands the guerrillas), Prince Norodom Sihanouk's *Moulinaka* group of 3,000, and the 9,000-man Khmer National People's Liberation Front of former Premier Sonn Sann.

But neither the attempt to reduce the prominence of the Khmer Rouge through a coalition, nor the strengthening of the anti-Vietnamese resistance with two additional (although much smaller and less experienced), groups has changed the reality of a Kampuchea garrisoned with Vietnamese troops and ruled by a government beholden to Hanoi and Moscow.

This reality, born of military power, has endured for four years.

For the Soviet Union, however, success has brought uncertainties. Vietnam has become heavily dependent on the Soviet Union. Periodically, the Soviet Union has had to supply grain, despite the vagaries of its own harvests. Like Cuba and East Europe, Vietnam relies on the Soviet Union for oil and, although the details are not known, receives most of it at favorable prices without paying hard currency. Despite the Soviet Union's own needs, thousands of Soviet technicians assist the Vietnamese in economic development and Soviet aid is central to Vietnam's economic plans.

To allocate some of this responsibility to East Europe, the Soviet Union supported Vietnam's entry into the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1978, and annual CMEA aid totals \$1 billion. But the East Europeans have reportedly been unhappy about this. While insisting that reports of Soviet-Vietnamese squabbling are exaggerated, Soviet scholars admit to a lack of harmony between Vietnam's expectations for aid on the one hand and Soviet abilities, given other commitments, on the other.<sup>23</sup> A story is apparently told in Hanoi about the extent of these expectations: in despair over the economic burden of Vietnam, Moscow cables: "Please try to tighten your belts." Replies Hanoi: "Please send belts." This, no doubt, is apocryphal. But until there is a political settlement in Kampuchea, Vietnam will look to the Soviet Union as its major source of economic help—and there is no evidence of an imminent settlement in Kampuchea.

Along with economic costs have come political costs. The display of Soviet-Vietnamese power in Kampuchea has undoubtedly led to closer cooperation between China and ASEAN. Despite occasional rumors of dissent, ASEAN has rejected Hanoi's proposals for an ASEAN-Indochina conference to try to reach an agreement on regional security and cooperation. China has characterized as ploys Hanoi's proposals (including Hanoi's offers in 1982 and 1983 to reduce its military presence in Kampuchea); and ASEAN has so far accepted China's description.

True, not all ASEAN countries share China's view that continued resistance in Kampuchea will erode Vietnamese strength, forcing a settlement. China's past ties with Communist guerrilla groups breed suspicion, especially in Indonesia and Malaysia; so does Beijing's claim that it now has only "political and moral" ties with those groups. True, there is an ironic link between the envious antipathy for the Chinese bourgeoisie living in Southeast Asia and the fear of China as

a Communist great power. True, Indonesia and Malaysia feel that constant pressure on Vietnam will only increase its dependence on the U.S.S.R. They see China, not Vietnam, as the future menace; they worry about what a more powerful China would be like, and they fear that Thailand's role as a conduit for Chinese arms to the Khmer Rouge and the American view of China as a counterweight to the U.S.S.R. suggest a dangerous equanimity about the increased political role of China in Southeast Asia. All these fears are encouraged by the Soviet Union. But ASEAN and China have been able to maintain a cooperative policy toward Vietnam despite these suspicions, and a shared concern about the Soviet-Vietnamese partnership is the bond of their unity.

It is difficult to know how Moscow balances the costs and benefits of its relationship with Vietnam. But there are benefits. Access to the Vietnamese ports of Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay gives Soviet ships deployed in the Indian Ocean facilities for rest and repairs well ahead of Vladivostok, while the use of Vietnamese airfields extends the radius of Soviet aircraft. A hostile and strong Vietnam also diverts some of China's military forces southward.

There are also economic benefits, although they are insufficient to offset the economic burden. The Soviet Union has been involved in oil prospecting in Vietnam and stands to gain from any large discoveries. Not only could Vietnam then fend for itself, but its oil could be sent to East Europe and Cuba. The barter trade with Vietnam gives the U.S.S.R. access to Vietnamese consumer goods and rubber without hard currency. Labor shortages in the Soviet Union are also reportedly being alleviated by some 20,000–50,000 Vietnamese workers.<sup>24</sup>

What is the future of Soviet-Vietnamese relations? The economic and political costs of the Vietnamese connection will continue to be borne by the Soviet Union. Vietnam is a strategic asset and, as realists, the Soviet leaders have no illusions about the proverbial free lunch. Rivalry for influence in Laos and Kampuchea, Soviet frustrations over the continuing war in Kampuchea, and the traditional tension between aid donor and recipient will test the endurance of the relationship; so will Vietnam's fierce dedication to its independence. As it did successfully between 1975 and 1978, Vietnam will try to reduce its economic dependence on the Soviet Union by finding other trade partners and sources of aid. But barring a settlement in Kampuchea and a major change in Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Soviet relations, a falling out between Moscow and Hanoi is unlikely. The expectation that the Soviet Union will offer Vietnam as a sacrificial lamb to appease China is not absurd; it is premature.

#### ON THE LIMITS OF MILITARY POWER

The essential objectives of foreign policy are security

<sup>23</sup>Interviews, Moscow, May, 1983.

<sup>24</sup>Thomas P. Thornton, "The USSR and Asia in 1982: The End of the Brezhnev Era," *Asian Survey*, vol. 23, no. 1 (January, 1983), p. 17. He reports that part of their pay may be deducted to help pay Vietnamese debts.

and influence. Security involves freedom from attack and the ability to import and export the goods and resources needed for the functioning of the economy. In this regard, Soviet East Asian policy has been successful, and Soviet military power has been an asset.

Influence involves affecting the behavior and views of other states. Here, the success of Soviet policy is debatable. To be sure, Soviet military power was the agent of change in Kampuchea; but that change brought with it Vietnam not only as a strategic asset, but Vietnam as a large economic burden.

One conclusion is clear: the uses of military power are limited. Foreign policy is concerned with many goals, and military power is not sufficiently versatile. In fact, the buildup of Soviet military power has led to greater political cooperation among the East Asian states—excluding, of course, Indochina—and it has increased their cooperation with the United States. It has also increased China's role in the region and the acceptance—though not without hesitation—of this role by ASEAN and Japan. ■

## THE SOVIET APPROACH TO WEST EUROPE

*(Continued from page 335)*

treties provide Moscow with a formal channel of influence and are commitments never to threaten the security of the Soviet Union and its régime.

Finlandization appears to be only the immediate Soviet design for Western Europe. In a wider historical perspective, it is intended to be a transitory stage characterized by increasingly comprehensive and direct dependence on the U.S.S.R. As long as the conditions of the Soviet-American rivalry necessitate tolerance of a showcase for Moscow's prudence, Finland can continue to exercise its active neutrality. But in the case of a break in West Europe's security links with the United States, Moscow's craving for absolute security is likely to reduce Finland's status to something much closer to the East European pattern.

At the moment, however, the U.S.S.R. is portraying its harmonious relations with Finland as a universal model of peaceful coexistence between socialism and capitalism, a small state and a superpower, and an ideal international arrangement that does not involve the risk of suffering the consequences of American globalism. This model, Soviet leaders argue, removes a country from the East-West conflict, provides it shelter from superpower domination and contributes to world stability in general.

The Soviet Union already detects in West Europe some preference for Finlandization. In West Germany this preference is known as a policy of equal distance, or simply pseudoneutrality. The Soviets call it détente and independence from the transatlantic superpower. Assertions of West European sovereignty are for the Soviet Union simply defiance of the United States, as

in the case of West European refusal to apply economic sanctions against the Soviet Union following the invasion of Afghanistan or refusal to take action against the Polish military regime for brutally suppressing the Solidarity movement. Differences between West Europe and the United States were strongly evident in the case of the prolonged dispute over the Siberian gas pipeline, and they are equally evident with regard to Central America.

Moscow also places strong emphasis on economic ties with West Europe. The Soviet Union takes credit for a substantial decrease of unemployment in the capitalist economies, since "hundreds of thousands" of workers owe their jobs to the "mutually beneficial" trade with CMEA countries. According to Soviet leaders, this trade has allowed West Europe to diversify its energy sources and markets, making it no longer dependent exclusively on the United States ability to dominate the oil-producing countries of the Middle East.

Viewed from Moscow, détente has intensified the contradiction between American globalism and European regionalism: West Europe wants peace and cooperation with the Soviet Union; the United States seeks confrontation. The fact is that West European governments regard as highly impolitic the American demand that the Soviet Union be punished for every transgression anywhere in the world. West Europe has rejected the American policy of global linkage. The benefits of improved East-West relations have greater value for West Europe than unproductive sanctions against the Soviet Union for events in Afghanistan, Poland or Central America. In this view, Soviet behavior will not be modified to the West's advantage by economic measures or outraged world opinion. If anything, the international isolation of Moscow may intensify its fixation with national security. Left without ties to the West, with less reason for self-restraint, the Soviet Union may return to the perilous policies of the cold war in Europe.

Soviet global strategy in the foreseeable future is likely to capitalize on this contradiction between American globalism and European regionalism, simultaneously applying pressure to the United States in the third world while showing conciliation to the countries of West Europe. The intention is to frustrate development of an effective comprehensive strategy against Soviet expansionism and to immobilize the Western alliance by isolating the United States as a menace to world peace while encouraging a parochial approach to security among the nations of West Europe. The Soviet Union will continue to promote the idea that not until there is a liquidation of foreign military bases and a withdrawal of United States forces can this "cradle of civilization" enjoy "genuine security."

The Soviet leadership has welcomed with special satisfaction the emergence in West Europe of a broadly

based mass movement for peace. For it developed at a time when West European Communist parties—particularly the Italian and Spanish parties—were becoming openly critical of Soviet or Soviet-sponsored military adventures. To retain their popularity, these parties were attempting to seek some neutral middle ground in the East-West conflict. In reaction to the imposition of martial law in Poland, Enrico Berlinguer, leader of the Italian Communists, went so far as to declare the end of Leninism as a popular ideology. Western Communist leaders have also come to recognize the economic and social failure of the Soviet model, which no longer appears attractive to Western workers even in economically distressed times. With Eurocommunism becoming a liability for the Soviet Union, Moscow needed a new ally.

Meanwhile, public concern over the threat of nuclear war has become a potentially divisive issue in NATO. More prevalent and emotional in West Europe than the United States, the peace movement has been praised by Moscow as evidence of the "growth of self-consciousness" among the peoples of West Europe and of the unity of mankind against a nuclear arms race promoted by Washington.

Moscow has skillfully exploited the differences between United States and West European governments over issues like the proper Western response to Soviet SS-20 deployments. A large part of the West European public has adopted a "better red than dead" attitude, while the mood in the United States under the Reagan administration has shown itself to be more assertive and nationalistic. Soviet propagandists have been fond of drawing contrasts between "peace-loving" Europeans and the transatlantic "warmongers."

The Soviets thus found in West Europe a useful if somewhat naive ally advocating disarmament and ready to hold the United States primarily responsible for the dangers posed by nuclear arms. Moscow has moved to exploit the movement as a way of frustrating the planned deployment in Europe of United States medium-range missiles and, in the longer term, to nurture opposition to a security policy based on the balance-of-power principle.

Soviet leaders approached the peace movement in a careful and restrained manner. They expressed appreciation for the movement's role in the "noble cause of bringing to the people of the world the ideas of friendship, mutual understanding and respect for the fundamental rights of all people, the right to live happily on earth." They also began providing financial assistance to the peace movement, estimated to be about \$30 million a year.

The main thrust of the Soviet propaganda effort was delivered by a special task force said to represent Soviet workers, scientists and clergy. Participation was represented as spontaneous. The emphasis was on voluntarism in order to create the impression of common

purpose between Soviet and Western populations bound—*independent of their governments*—by goodwill and reason. Attention was to be focused on the American nuclear arsenal with the aid of Soviet government statements expressing Moscow's commitment to peace and its readiness to reduce Soviet nuclear and conventional forces if only the United States would be reasonable.

Soviet leaders argue that the Americans are using the Geneva arms limitation talks only as a screen for deploying United States missiles because the Reagan administration is committed to raising international tensions. The Western public is told it can free itself from the danger of American nuclear aggression, and that it can break the impasse at Geneva by a united front with the Soviet public. It can count on Soviet military might, whose peaceful and defensive mission restrains American imperialism. More arms for the West, the Soviet message goes, will result not in more security, but less. The Soviet aim is transparent: with the assistance of some 20 million people in the antiwar movement, it hopes to reduce West European security to the point where it will appear that Europe has no alternative but to seek an accommodation with Moscow at Washington's expense.

The peace movement is being presented by the Soviet Union as a manifestation of a universal concern that crosses ideological lines. Soviet leaders compare it to the anti-Fascist coalition during World War II that united East and West, Communists and non-Communists alike, in defense of civilization. Now the struggle is directed against "nuclear maniacs" and "ignorant men" like President Reagan and his advisers. People are taking part "regardless of the ideals, views or interests by which they guide themselves in other spheres of their life and work."

This explains why the Soviet Union has mobilized part of its scientific community to educate world opinion on the biological consequences of nuclear war and to stress the similarity of views between Soviet and Western scientists acting together to restrain American militarism. Soviet media applaud the courage of West European physicians, teachers, lawyers, students and trade union officials in opposing their political leaders on nuclear issues.

The Soviet clergy has been assigned the task of elaborating the moral aspects of nuclear war. Suddenly the U.S.S.R. has become the host of theological meetings to discuss "the immorality of the Pentagon's nuclear program." Soviet leaders emphasize what they describe as a phenomenal identity of views despite the broad political spectrum of the peace movement whose ideological range spans "50 million ultrapatriotic and ultrarightist" American Catholics as well as Soviet Communists. Soviet leaders contend that the movement is a worldwide coalition that puts aside ideological differences to unite against a United States Defense De-

partment that is isolated but still capable of provoking part of the movement, and is doing everything possible "to secure for this and future generations a calm and peaceful future." Because of this, of course, Soviet "fighters for peace" have no need for anti-government actions.

The objective of the Soviet peace campaign is to divide the Western public and erode the consensus behind NATO foreign policy. The Soviet task has been facilitated by the coincidental and probably short-lived unity of purpose between the Soviet government and West European demonstrators to prevent the deployment of new American missiles. An underlying contradiction, of course, is that the Western peace movement is in essence a resistance to all nuclear arms, including the huge Soviet arsenal. It is not intended to be an endorsement of Moscow's foreign policy. On the one hand, the Western peace movement is by and large independent of the Soviet Union; on the other it is far from having a decisive impact on Western policies. The Soviet Union rather simplistically tends to regard anything smacking of anti-American as being support for its cause. This is one reason why Soviet propaganda successes in the West are usually short-lived and restricted to the politically least experienced generations.

#### CONCLUSION

Soviet leaders have based their recent policy in West Europe on a misunderstanding of the democratic process. For them, free public debate appears to be a sign of weakness, a deepening of the crisis of capitalism prophesized by Marx and Lenin. Despite their skills at *realpolitik* and their considerable diplomatic sophistication, Soviet leaders and their propaganda experts have not yet been led to reassess their self-destructive view of the West or their simplistic global perspective that assumes that all mankind is polarized around socialism or capitalism.

Soviet advocacy of peace and cooperation in Europe has been made to appear somewhat less seductive and certainly more cynical in light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and threats to Poland. The Afghan adventure spelled the end of *détente* and dealt a fatal blow to SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty). The imposition of martial law in Poland also had an eye-opening effect on the Western public, especially the public oriented to the Left. With the imposition of martial law the last illusions about the Soviet system disappeared. The political ambitions of Solidarity were essentially those of the Eurocommunists, that is, reconciling the ideas of Marx with democracy. As a result of the Polish revolt and its suppression, Moscow lost a powerful lobby, which unlike the peace movement or the "realists" who act out of fear, were inspired by the same ideals the Soviet Union pretends to embody.

A relentless search for absolute security is a driving

force of Soviet foreign policy. In Moscow's global view, West Europe should be a Soviet protectorate to supplement the established security layers in East Europe—the people's democracies and Soviet republics. At present, West Europe is militarily weak and the military presence of the United States is the ultimate obstacle to the extension of Soviet influence to the Atlantic and unrestrained access to the high technology essential to a superpower. Moscow has consistently refused to make a permanent accommodation to the United States status as a European power. And it is determined to break the Western alliance along the Atlantic in anticipation of the time when West Europe, exposed to Soviet might, will assume the international status of Finland.

The Soviet Union, however, has failed to realize that United States-West European frictions are not caused by a different understanding of Soviet objectives and political methods but by differences over how to respond to Soviet assertiveness. The distinction is important.

Although disarray within the alliance is substantial, it is unlikely to have a permanent impact or produce consequences historically beneficial to the U.S.S.R. Most likely it will mark another evolutionary step in the alignment of the forces in NATO. Atlanticism has prevailed again, and by popular will. So far Soviet policy has been self-defeating, since deployment of the SS-20's balanced by the new American missiles will only decrease Moscow's security vis-à-vis the West, and the United States in particular. The same effect is likely to be produced by the Soviet challenge to American globalism.

Historically, West Europe has not been known for its pacifism and, when presented with a choice, it is more likely to prefer a Europeanist alternative to the neutralist or Finnish option. If West European interests sometimes diverge from those of the United States, they are altogether alien to basic Soviet interests. It should be remembered that West Europe has all the human and material resources to become a superpower in its own right. It is not impossible that the Soviet Union may succeed where the United States has failed—in bringing about the political unity and military self-reliance of the nations of West Europe. ■

#### SOVIET POLITICS

*(Continued from page 333)*

Minister of Defense as well, as was done in the early 1950's. Since Gromyko does not seem to have been given any wider responsibilities, it seems increasingly likely that one of the purposes of the appointment was to differentiate him from Ustinov. In addition, if Romanov is going to handle the defense industry and the military, that, too, means Politburo competition for Ustinov in his major spheres of activity and some restriction on his real power. It seems wildly improbable

that Ustinov would be selected General Secretary in the case of Andropov's death.

Chernenko seems an even less likely successor. The notion that he is leading a coalition of the party bureaucrats against Andropov surely is a misreading of the present situation. Brezhnev rested his power first on the Dnepropetrovsk machine linked with Kirilenko and, second, on a few old Moldavian associates linked with Chernenko. The Kirilenko men were the core of the party apparatus, and Andropov has allied himself closely with them against Chernenko. Chernenko would never have been a credible independent candidate unless Brezhnev had imposed him, and he is weaker today than he was last November.

The man who has been most obviously groomed as a successor to Andropov is Mikhail Gorbachev, the 52-year-old Central Committee secretary. Although he was not in control of personnel selection, he clearly is in the inner core of the leadership. In recent months he has been given all the important assignments. He was chosen to give the speech on the anniversary of Lenin's birthday in April—one of the two big ceremonial speeches of the year. He traveled to Canada in June, and then in July made the trip to Kursk for the celebration of the great World War II victory there (a victory on the same scale as Stalingrad). He was given the responsibility of nominating the new chairman of the Council of the Ministers of the R.S.F.S.R. at the session of the R.S.F.S.R. Supreme Soviet, and he accompanied Romanov to Leningrad to install the latter's successor. (These were two signs that he had been given responsibility for personnel.)

In addition, Gorbachev has the appearance of an heir apparent. Unlike men like Andropov, Chernenko and Romanov, who do not have full-time college degrees, in 1955 Gorbachev graduated from the prestigious Moscow University, where he was the Communist League of Youth (Komsomol) secretary. He must have handled the post-Stalin unrest at the university well; it should also be remembered that he was admitted to the university at a time when the standards of admission were very strict. After a few years of Komsomol service, he became a party official who concentrated primarily on rural, agricultural work; but he also served as first secretary of the Stavropol city party committee. He had worked for eight years as first secretary of the Stavropol territorial party committee when he was named Central Committee secretary for agriculture in 1978. Since then his responsibilities have been broadened, at a minimum, to include the entire agro-industrial complex. In the last year he has been associated with the most important economic reform—the collective contract in agriculture—and he handled the questioning on the Canadian trip with great skill.

Gorbachev's only serious challenger would seem to be Georgii Romanov, and this only if Romanov has been given overall responsibility for the economy

and/or personnel selection. Even then, he has only a night school education, and he lacks Gorbachev's five years of experience in the Central Committee secretariat. He has appeared unknowledgeable and crude in the realm of foreign policy when meeting American delegations. That he did not install his own successor in Leningrad, that he went on vacation immediately after being elected Central Committee secretary, and that he apparently does not have major responsibility for the economy are all signs that he is not a serious candidate for the succession in the near term.

Whether another succession will, in fact, take place in the near future is a matter on which it is impossible to make a firm judgment. Brezhnev demonstrated that a leader can survive for years with a debilitating illness, and, unlike Brezhnev, Andropov still has a very clear mind.

The basic fact to be kept in mind in evaluating the Soviet Union, however, is that the selection of a successor to Brezhnev, namely, Andropov, who himself is seriously ill, makes all judgments about the mid-1980's extremely difficult and unreliable. The relatively slow pace of change to date may represent anything from immobilism in the system to the illness of the General Secretary; and these explanations imply radically different predictions for the future. If Andropov is to be succeeded in the relatively near future by a man 17 years younger—a man 25 years younger than Brezhnev—the consequences of this generational change make projections particularly dangerous. Except perhaps for trying to avoid affecting this sequence of successions unfavorably, American policymakers should adopt the position of fascinated observers. They should keep open minds, constantly rethinking their assumptions as events unfold and trying to develop the flexibility to react intelligently if the Soviet Union begins to evolve in unexpected ways. ■

## BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 334)

YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST AFFAIRS: 1983. Edited by Robert Wesson. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983. 590 pages, bibliography, notes, tables and indexes, \$44.95, cloth.)

This is an indispensable reference source for those needing information on Communist parties or states.

O.E.S.

AFGHANISTAN UNDER SOVIET DOMINATION, 1964-1981. By Anthony Hyman. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. 223 pages, appendix and index, \$20.00.)

After devoting several brief chapters to historical background, this interesting study takes a close look at post-April, 1978, developments in Afghanistan.

A.Z.R. ■

# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

*A Current History chronology covering the most important events of August, 1983, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

## INTERNATIONAL

### Arms Control

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Aug. 2—In Geneva, U.S.-Soviet negotiations on the reduction of strategic arms are recessed for 2 months.

### European Economic Community (EEC)

Aug. 31—EEC officials say that they are demanding at least \$150 million in trade compensation from the U.S. for its "illegal" protection of specialty steelmakers in the U.S.

### International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Aug. 26—The Fund approves a \$14.1-million loan to the leftist government of Grenada; the U.S. vigorously opposed the loan.

Officials say that a \$6-billion loan for the Fund is being negotiated with 4 Western nations and Saudi Arabia.

### Iran-Iraq War

Aug. 1—The Iraqi government says its forces killed 1,200 Iranian soldiers in a battle that began on July 30.

### Middle East

Aug. 1—In the Bekaa Valley, fighting continues between rival factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Aug. 3—Israel rejects a Lebanese request for a public schedule of Israel's troop withdrawals from Lebanon.

### United Nations (U.N.)

(See also *South Africa*)

Aug. 22—U.N. Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar arrives in Cape Town, South Africa, for talks on the independence of Namibia.

Aug. 31—Charles Lichenstein, part of the U.S. delegation to the U.N., says that the Security Council's inaction on Chad shows "its utter futility as an effective instrument of international peace and security."

In a report to the Security Council on his mission in southern Africa, Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar says that he made "no real progress" toward independence for Namibia.

### AFGHANISTAN

Aug. 20—Abdul Rasool Sayaf, head of the Mujahedeen guerrillas, says that guerrillas killed 1,500 Russian and Afghan government troops in July.

### ANGOLA

Aug. 14—The official press agency reports that government troops defeated a guerrilla attack in eastern Angola; the agency says that 1,100 guerrillas were killed.

### ARGENTINA

Aug. 11—The offices of the magazine *El Porteño* are destroyed in a bomb attack; an article on the disap-

pearance of hundreds of children during the army's war on terrorists was published in the magazine last week.

Aug. 17—The government signs a 5-year, \$1.5-billion loan accord with a consortium of 300 international banks.

Aug. 19—About 25,000 people march in Buenos Aires to protest a proposed amnesty program for the military that would protect them from prosecution for the disappearance of thousands of people during the war against the terrorists in the 1970's.

Aug. 22—The head of the Peronist party says a letter has been mailed to former President Isabel Martínez de Perón, inviting her to return from self-imposed exile in Spain.

Aug. 31—President Reynaldo Bignone says he will pardon Perón, clearing the way for her return.

### BANGLADESH

(See *India*)

### BRAZIL

Aug. 22—Finance Minister Ernane Glaveas says that the government has suspended principal and interest payments on \$2 billion of the country's \$90-billion foreign debt.

### CANADA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 12—Following the release of a Gallup poll showing only a 27 percent approval rating for his party, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau replaces 5 of his Cabinet members and orders 8 others to exchange portfolios.

### CHAD

(See also *France; U.S., Foreign Policy; Zaire*)

Aug. 2—The government denies a Libyan report that President Hissen Habré has been killed in action; the government says that the President is commanding the army, which is fighting the Libyan-backed forces of former President Goukouni Oueddei.

Aug. 6—At a news conference, President Habré asks France to commit forces to Chad to protect the government.

Aug. 8—The government presents a captured Libyan air force pilot as evidence that Libya is actively intervening in Chad; the pilot says that the air force has dropped napalm bombs.

Aug. 11—Libyan troops and Oueddei's forces capture the strategically important northern oasis of Faya-Largeau.

Aug. 14—Following yesterday's deployment of French paratroopers to eastern Chad, another force of French paratroopers is deployed to the northern town of Salal.

Aug. 22—Information Minister Mahamat Soumalia says that French aid has been inadequate and that French forces should "wage war" against the Libyan and guerrilla troops in northern Chad.

Aug. 28—Oueddei's rebels offer to negotiate a solution to the conflict if French troops are withdrawn from the country.

#### CHILE

Aug. 7—Gabriel Valdes, the head of the Christian Democratic party, announces the formation of a 5-party Democratic Alliance in opposition to the military government of President Augusto Pinochet; the other alliance members are the Democratic Rightists, the Social Democrats, the Radicals and the Socialists.

Aug. 10—President Pinochet announces that he has replaced 7 of his 20 Cabinet members; he also orders 18,000 soldiers into the streets of Santiago in preparation for tomorrow's antigovernment protest.

Aug. 12—The government says that at least 17 civilians were killed in yesterday's protests; more than 1,200 people were arrested in the worst violence in the 10 years of Pinochet's rule.

7 more people are killed by troops and police in Santiago during the second day of protests against the government.

Aug. 14—In an interview with the Santiago newspaper *El Mercurio*, Interior Minister Sergio Onofre Jarpa says that the government will try to speed up the date of congressional elections now scheduled for 1990.

Aug. 30—A leftist guerrilla group claims responsibility for today's assassination of the military governor of Santiago, Carol Urzúa.

#### CHINA

Aug. 6—in Beijing, 2 groups headed by the Occidental Petroleum Corporation of Los Angeles sign contracts with the government to drill for oil in the South China Sea.

Aug. 7—A Chinese air force test pilot defects to South Korea in a MiG-21 fighter.

Aug. 8—*The China Daily* reports that foreign concerns invested nearly \$5 billion in China between 1979 and 1982.

Aug. 22—The editor of *Jane's Fighting Ships* says that China has developed a nuclear-powered submarine capable of firing 16 nuclear missiles with a range of 1,800 miles.

Aug. 24—Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang tells 2 foreign oil contractors that China will not nationalize any foreign oil discoveries.

Aug. 27—After meeting with Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, U.S. Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) says that relations between China and the U.S. are improving and should be expanded. He also says that reciprocal visits by Prime Minister Ziyang and President Ronald Reagan are now possible.

#### COLOMBIA

Aug. 29—Members of the Salvadoran guerrilla leadership meet for the 1st time with members of the Salvadoran government; the meeting is moderated by Colombian President Belisario Betancur.

#### COSTA RICA

Aug. 30—U.S. special envoy Richard Stone meets with 4 Salvadoran rebel leaders; the leaders say that they will not participate in elections planned for next year.

#### EGYPT

Aug. 1—The Supreme Court of Ethics orders the release of Ismat Sadat, brother of the late President An-

war Sadat; Sadat has been in prison for fraudulent activities that netted him \$100 million.

#### EL SALVADOR

(See also *Colombia; Costa Rica; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 1—Following yesterday's meeting with U.S. special envoy to Central America Richard Stone, Rubén Zamora, a leader of the leftist political opposition, says that preparations are under way for a meeting "with an open agenda" between the Salvadoran left and the U.S.

Aug. 9—5 of the 6 political parties recommend that elections scheduled for December be held in February, 1984, instead.

Aug. 11—Defense Minister Eugenio Vides Casanova says that 2,292 government troops have been killed since July, 1982; this is double the total for the same period last year.

Aug. 14—Government officials say that they have reached an agreement with Guatemala on closer military cooperation between the two countries.

Aug. 24—A criminal court sentences a soldier to 30 years in prison for the murder of a seminary student; it is the 1st time a military man has been convicted of a human rights violation since the civil war began.

#### EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Aug. 28—The 1st parliamentary elections in 10 years are held; only a single list of government-approved candidates is presented for the 41 seats.

#### FRANCE

(See also *Chad; Lebanon; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 7—Defense Minister Charles Hernu says that no combat planes or ground troops will be sent by France to its former colony Chad; President Hissen Habré of Chad asked for such French support yesterday.

Aug. 8—Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson says that the U.S. did not consult with France before it sent 2 Awacs electronic surveillance planes to Chad.

Aug. 10—At least 500 paratroopers are being sent to Chad, according to the Defense Ministry.

Aug. 16—In an interview with the newspaper *Le Monde*, President François Mitterrand says that he sent troops to Chad to encourage the Libyans to agree to a negotiated settlement to the conflict; he also says that "things would have been much less complicated if the United States had not weighed so heavily in the balance."

Aug. 21—10 jet combat aircraft are sent to Chad.

Aug. 24—The government calls on Libya and the Libyan-backed forces fighting the government in Chad to agree to a negotiated settlement to the conflict.

#### GERMANY, EAST

Aug. 16—General Secretary Erich Honecker arrives in Warsaw; he is the 1st Soviet-bloc leader to visit since 1980.

#### grenada

(See *Intl. IMF*)

#### GUATEMALA

(See also *El Salvador; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 5—in an interview with reporters, President Efraín Ríos Montt says that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are only interested in geopolitical maneuvering in Central America; "They do not want to help us."

Aug. 8—President Ríos Montt is overthrown by the military in the 2d coup in 17 months; he is replaced by Brigadier General Oscar Humberto Mejía Victores.

Aug. 9—General Mejía Victores announces the end of restrictions on civil liberties; he promises a quick return to "democracy."

### INDIA

Aug. 13—The government announces that it plans to put up a 2,500-mile-long barbed wire fence along its border with Bangladesh to prevent illegal crossing.

### IRAN

(See also *Intl, Iran-Iraq War*)

Aug. 1—Prime Minister Mir Hussein Moussavi announces that Iran will not participate in the 1984 Olympic Games because of U.S. "interference" in the Middle East and Central America.

Aug. 23—The government pays the U.S. Export-Import Bank the \$419.5 million it owed from claims that arose during the taking of U.S. hostages in Iran in 1979-1980.

### IRAQ

(See *Intl, Iran-Iraq War*)

### ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East; Lebanon; Liberia; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 25—The government reportedly agrees to a U.S. request that Israel delay the withdrawal of its troops to southern Lebanon by a few days.

Aug. 28—Prime Minister Menachem Begin announces to his Cabinet that he intends to resign.

Aug. 30—Begin tells his Likud party supporters that he is determined to resign within a few days.

### ITALY

Aug. 4—Bettino Craxi is sworn in as the 1st Socialist Prime Minister; the Socialists hold only 5 ministries in the 29-member Cabinet.

### KOREA, SOUTH

Aug. 31—A Korean Airlines 747 passenger jet with 269 people on board is missing over the Sea of Japan.

### LEBANON

(See also *Intl, Middle East; Israel*)

Aug. 2—6 armies fight in the Bekaa Valley and throughout southern Lebanon; Syrians and Israelis, Christian Phalangists and Israelis, the Lebanese army and the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) and factions fighting within the PLO all wage separate battles.

Aug. 5—A car bomb explodes in front of a mosque in Tripoli; 19 people are killed and 43 injured.

Aug. 7—A car bomb of more than 200 pounds of dynamite explodes at a market in Baalbek; 33 people are killed and 125 wounded.

Aug. 11—3 government ministers who were kidnapped yesterday by Druse Muslim militiamen are released.

Aug. 18—Prime Minister Shafik al-Wazzan says he will not resign; yesterday he said he would resign.

Aug. 22—6 people are killed in shelling near Beirut; Druse militiamen and Christian militia units are responsible for the fighting.

Aug. 29—Fighting between Druse militiamen and Lebanese army units kills 2 U.S. Marines and wounds 14 others; the Marines are part of the multinational

peacekeeping force that has been in Lebanon for the past year.

Aug. 30—Continued fighting between Druse and Lebanese army units leaves 4 French members of the peacekeeping force dead.

Aug. 31—6,000 Lebanese army troops enter West Beirut, gaining control of the areas held by Druse militiamen.

### LIBERIA

Aug. 23—President Samuel K. Doe meets with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin in Jerusalem; President Doe says he will ask other African nations to develop diplomatic relations with Israel.

### LIBYA

(See *Chad; France; Upper Volta*)

### MEXICO

Aug. 14—In a speech welcoming visiting U.S. President Ronald Reagan, President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado says that international problems are aggravated by "shows of force which threaten to touch off a conflagration." President Reagan says that relations between the U.S. and Mexico are "excellent."

### NAMIBIA

(See *South Africa*)

### NICARAGUA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 1—U.S. Defense Department officials report that the Soviet Union has increased its shipments of heavy weapons to Nicaragua, nearly doubling what it sent in all 1982.

Aug. 14—Diplomats in Managua report that the government is prepared to send home all Cuban military advisers and stop the import of Soviet arms if there is a reduction in the U.S. military presence in Honduras.

Aug. 23—An official of one of the guerrilla groups battling the government says that the Nicaraguan Democratic Forces, which are financed and backed by the U.S., plan to merge with the independent guerrilla group operating in southern Nicaragua that is headed by former Sandinist Edén Pastora Gómez.

Aug. 25—The Defense Ministry issues a statement saying that the country faces "a new escalation of aggression"; there are reports that at least 2,000 anti-Sandinist guerrillas have entered Nicaragua from Honduras.

### NIGERIA

Aug. 11—The Federal Election Commission announces that President Shehu Shagari has been elected to a 2d 4-year term; elections were held on August 6.

Spokesmen for the 5 opposition parties accuse the government of vote-rigging in 1 or more states.

Aug. 19—At least 70 people have been killed in post-election violence, many in the states of Oyo and Ondo, where vote tampering is suspected.

### PAKISTAN

Aug. 12—President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq announces that national and provincial elections will be held by March 23, 1985; the military has ruled the country since 1976.

Aug. 13—Opposition politicians from an alliance of 8 banned parties say that they will begin a civil disobedience campaign to force the government to hold elections sooner than 1985.

Aug. 14—In Karachi, over 20,000 people protest President Zia's military government; 10,000 pro-government supporters attack the demonstrators.

Aug. 19—The government announces that military courts have sentenced 61 political opponents of President Zia to prison sentences of at least 1 year.

Aug. 22—1 protester is killed and another wounded when police fire on a crowd protesting President Zia's continued rule; at least 14 protesters have been killed in demonstrations in the last 8 days.

### PARAGUAY

Aug. 15—General Alfredo Stroessner is sworn in for his 7th term as President; Stroessner has ruled the country under a state of siege since 1954.

### PHILLIPINES

Aug. 5—President Ferdinand Marcos issues a decree repealing an earlier order that allowed the imprisonment of people suspected of being rebels.

Aug. 22—Benigno S. Aquino Jr., President Marcos's leading political rival, is murdered within minutes of his return from self-exile in the U.S.; opposition party leaders blame the government for the killing.

Appearing at a televised news conference, President Marcos says that foes of his regime are trying to "spread panic" and discredit his government; he also says that the killing of Aquino might have been a "Communist rub-out job."

Aug. 25—The government announces the formation of an "impartial" commission to investigate the killing of Aquino; the commission is headed by a Marcos appointee to the Supreme Court.

Aug. 29—Almost 1 million people line the 80-mile route traveled by the motorcade carrying Aquino's body from his home province to Manila for burial.

Aug. 31—At least 1 million people line the route taken by Aquino's funeral procession in Manila; 1 youth is killed and 18 are wounded in fighting with police.

### POLAND

(See also *Germany, East*)

Aug. 2—In an interview with the Italian magazine *Gente*, Lech Walesa, head of the banned labor union Solidarity, says that Pope John Paul II did not urge him to "retire from politics when we met at Zakopane" during the Pope's visit in June.

Aug. 8—Roman Catholic Church sources report that Jozef Cardinal Glemp, the Polish Primate, has stopped discussions on a church-state agricultural aid program because of the government's inaction on human rights petitions presented by Glemp.

Aug. 11—The Justice Ministry announces that it will release 476 political prisoners; 60 Solidarity members remain in prison.

Aug. 14—A march by about 1,000 people in Gdansk is broken up by police; the march was to commemorate the 3d anniversary of the strike that led to the formation of Solidarity.

Aug. 18—The official press agency reports that the government and Western bankers have agreed to reschedule \$2.6 billion in Polish debts that are due in 1983.

Aug. 19—The government dissolves the Union of Writers for "antistate political opposition"; the union, one of the most important in Poland, was openly sympathetic to Solidarity and refused to adopt a government-sponsored resolution that all writers should endorse Communist values in their work.

Aug. 24—The government grants unconditional amnesty to Wladyslaw Hardek, a senior leader of Solidarity who surrendered yesterday.

Aug. 31—Marking the 3d anniversary of the formation of Solidarity, thousands of people demonstrate in Gdansk, Nowa Huta, Warsaw and 5 other cities; riot police break up the demonstrations and there are reports that 1 person was killed and several wounded.

### SOMALIA

Aug. 30—A U.S.-financed \$20-million port modernization project at Berbera begins.

### SOUTH AFRICA

(See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Aug. 20—The largest anti-government rally in 25 years takes place outside Cape Town; the rally launches a new multiracial movement—the United Democratic Front—opposed to constitutional provisions that would give limited political power to some nonwhite races but none to blacks.

Aug. 24—Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha says that the only obstacle to independence for Namibia is the presence of Cuban troops in neighboring Angola.

Aug. 30—The government announces that it is suspending the quota system restricting the number of nonwhite students attending white universities; other racial admissions restrictions remain in effect.

### SRI LANKA

Aug. 2—Government spokesman Douglas Liyanage announces the arrest of the leaders of the banned Communist party; 2 other leftist party leaders are wanted by the government, which blames last week's ethnic rioting on leftists and an unnamed foreign source.

Aug. 6—The government confirms reports that army troops killed 20 civilians on a bus two weeks ago after guerrillas killed 13 soldiers in an earlier incident.

### U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl, Arms Control; Afghanistan; Nicaragua, U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 4—*The New York Times* reports that a confidential memorandum circulating among Soviet officials argues that centralized controls on the economy have slowed production and that the power of the bureaucracy over the economy must be reduced.

Aug. 15—President Yuri Andropov tells senior Communist party officials that it is necessary to go beyond the half-measures that have been introduced in the past to get the economy moving; he says this will require "changes in planning, management and the economic mechanism."

Aug. 17—At a meeting at the Kremlin with U.S. labor leader William Winpisinger, Andropov says that the Soviet Union will follow a "constructive and flexible line" at the talks on intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

Aug. 18—Meeting with 9 Democratic members of the U.S. Senate, Andropov proposes that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. agree to ban antisatellite weapons.

Aug. 26—in an interview published today in *Pravda*,

Andropov says that the U.S.S.R. would "liquidate" the SS-20 missiles it would remove from Europe if an agreement were reached at the talks in Geneva on U.S. Pershing and cruise missiles.

## UNITED STATES

### Administration

Aug. 1—Speaking to the American Bar Association in Atlanta, President Ronald Reagan defends his civil rights record and claims to have put "more women in top posts than any administration before us."

Aug. 2—President Reagan tells a panel of experts to examine the reports of increasing hunger among the poor and give him a "no-holds-barred study."

The Census Bureau reports that the national poverty rate rose to 15 percent in 1982, the highest figure in 17 years.

Aug. 3—The Justice Department files suit in U.S. district court against the General Motors Corporation to force the company to recall and repair defects in some 1.1 million cars, the X-body models sold in 1980.

Aug. 4—A federal grand jury indicts former Environmental Protection Agency (E.P.A.) official Rita M. Lavelle on 5 felony counts of lying about her actions as head of one of the agency's divisions.

Aug. 11—The Agriculture Department estimates the 1983 corn crop at 5.24 billion bushels, down from previous estimates because of drought.

In a 53-page report, the Justice Department says it has not found sufficient evidence to prosecute former E.P.A. administrator Anne M. Buford and 5 other E.P.A. officials.

Aug. 17—The Department of Health and Human Services sets rates for federal payment by Medicare for terminally ill patients who receive hospice care either at home or in institutions. The home care rate is \$53 per day; the institutional rate is \$271 per day.

Aug. 22—Special Justice Department assistant Barbara Honegger, who was working to eliminate sex discrimination in U.S. and state laws, resigns, calling the project "a sham" because President Reagan does not care about woman's rights.

Aug. 23—Speaking in Seattle to a national American Legion convention, President Reagan says that the peace movement of today "would wage peace by weakening the free. That doesn't make sense."

Aug. 26—Speaking to an audience of 400 Republican women in San Diego, President Reagan defends his record on women and his economic policies.

Aug. 30—The E.P.A. estimates the hazardous waste generated in the U.S. in 1981 at some 150 million metric tons; its original estimate for 1981 was 40 million metric tons.

Aug. 31—Secretary of Health and Human Services Margaret Heckler announces new Medicare regulations under which each of the 9 regions of the country will pay standard predetermined hospital rates for the care of elderly and disabled patients; this marks the beginning of a program to set nationwide standard hospital rates for all Medicare patients.

President Reagan drops a proposal to freeze the pay of 1.4 million white collar federal employees and calls for a 3.5 percent pay raise for them beginning in January, 1984.

### Civil Rights

Aug. 27—Some 300,000 marchers rally in Washington, D.C., to celebrate the 1963 civil rights march led by

Martin Luther King Jr. that inspired the civil rights movement.

### Economy

Aug. 5—The Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate declined to 9.3 percent in July.

Aug. 8—Most major banks raise their prime rate to 11 percent.

Aug. 19—The Commerce Department issues a revised gross national product (GNP) figure for the 2nd quarter of 1983; the GNP grew at an annual rate of 9.2 percent in that quarter.

Aug. 23—The Labor Department reports that its consumer price index rose 0.4 percent in July.

Aug. 29—The Commerce Department reports a U.S. trade deficit of \$6.36 billion in July.

Aug. 31—The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators rose 0.3 percent in July.

### Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl. Arms Control, IMF; Chad; China; Costa Rica; El Salvador; France; Iran; Israel; Lebanon; Mexico; Nicaragua; Somalia; U.S.S.R.*)

Aug. 1—The White House reports that Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige have recommended that President Reagan relax controls on the export of oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union; the controls were originally imposed in July, 1978, by President Jimmy Carter because of Soviet violations of human rights.

Aug. 3—President Reagan meets with Richard B. Stone, his special envoy to Central America. Stone reports on his meeting with Salvadoran rebel Democratic Revolutionary Front leader Rubén Zamora.

The Defense Department reports that 2 U.S. electronic surveillance planes (Awacs) have arrived in Egypt to observe Libyan warplane activity.

The Defense Department reports that a U.S. destroyer, the *Lynde McCormick*, came within three-fourths of a mile of the Soviet freighter *Ulyanov* on July 30 to ask its destination; both vessels were off the Pacific coast of Nicaragua.

Aug. 4—Assistant Secretary of Defense Henry E. Catto Jr. says that any Soviet ship in the waters off Central America will be met by a U.S. warship to underscore the U.S. naval presence there.

Administration officials report that President Reagan will increase to \$25 million (from \$10 million) the aid package for the government of Chad, which is fighting a Libyan-backed insurgency.

Secretary of State Shultz tells the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that American military forces on maneuvers in Central America "will defend themselves but they will withdraw" if attacked.

Aug. 6—The State Department reports that U.S. Awacs planes, F-15 fighter escorts and other support equipment are being dispatched to bases where the military situation in Chad can be monitored most usefully.

Aug. 7—Secretary of State Shultz says that he doesn't "see any armed U.S. effort to overthrow the government of Nicaragua. . . ."

Aug. 8—Acting under the War Powers Act, President Reagan notifies Congress of the deployment of 2 Awacs planes, 8 F-15 fighter planes and ground logistical support forces to aid the beleaguered government of Chad.

Aug. 9—Ambassador to Guatemala Frederic L. Chapin

meets there with the country's new President, Brigadier General Oscar Humberto Mejía Victores, and applauds his pledge to continue "returning the country to democratic government."

Army Chief of Staff General John A. Wickham Jr. tells reporters that U.S. military force capabilities are probably being exceeded by the "range of contingencies" to which we are committed.

Aug. 12—Speaking to the convention of the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce in Tampa, President Reagan defends his Latin American policies and denounces Cuba as a source of Central American insurrections.

Aug. 15—Speaking to the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention in New Orleans, President Reagan calls news coverage of his Central American policies "hype and hoopla."

Aug. 16—White House spokesman Larry Speakes reports that the State Department has sent France a note expressing "the deep regrets" of the U.S. for hiding former Gestapo officer Klaus Barbie, the "butcher of Lyons," from the French after World War II. The U.S. Army employed Barbie, a known Gestapo agent and a fugitive from French justice, as a spy and helped him to escape to Bolivia after World War II.

Aug. 17—President Reagan denies that the U.S. pressured France to act in the Chad crisis.

Aug. 20—The Commerce Department says that President Reagan has ordered the end of export controls on some pipeline equipment to the Soviet Union.

Aug. 23—in Ottawa, U.S. and Canadian officials sign an agreement to conduct a joint project to trace the sources of the acid rain problems affecting both countries.

State Department spokesman Alan Romberg reports that U.S. Awacs and support personnel are being redeployed to the U.S. from the Sudan.

Aug. 25—in Moscow, U.S. and Soviet representatives sign a new 5-year grain agreement under which the Soviet Union is committed to buying 9 million metric tons of grain in each of the next 5 years and may buy as much as 12 million metric tons.

Aug. 26—The State Department reports that the U.S. and the Soviet Union will reopen negotiations for a new cultural and scientific exchange agreement.

Aug. 27—President Reagan says he is "concerned over the negative effect" that Israel's building of settlements on the West Bank has on the prospects for peace in the Middle East.

Aug. 28—U.S. special envoy to Central America Richard Stone arrives in Honduras to start a Central American tour.

Aug. 31—Secretary of State Shultz restates the administration's position that although the U.S. Marines in Lebanon "are involved in a situation where there is violence. . ." they are not in combat. If they were said to be in combat, Congress could force their departure from Lebanon within 90 days.

#### Legislation

Aug. 3—The House approves an \$8.4-billion increase in the U.S. contribution to the International Monetary Fund in a close 217-211 vote; the measure now goes to House-Senate conference.

In a voice vote, the Senate completes congressional action on a bill raising maximum Medicare payments for hospice care to \$6,400.

In a voice vote, the House approves a \$10.9-billion

transportation bill that provides \$400 million for mass transit; the Senate previously approved the measure, which now goes to the President.

Aug. 4—The House and Senate adjourn for 5 weeks.

Aug. 12—President Reagan signs a bill intended to restore and maintain the solvency of the railroad pension plan retirement system, the only private pension plan operated by the U.S. government. The House passed the bill August 1; the Senate passed it August 2.

Aug. 13—President Ronald Reagan vetoes a bill passed by both houses of Congress August 1 that would have provided \$20 million for the desegregation of the Chicago public schools. (On June 30, U.S. district court Judge Milton Shadur ordered some \$55 million in educational funds across the country frozen until Congress provides the money for Chicago.)

#### Science and Space

Aug. 30—in the first night launching of a space shuttle, *Challenger* lifts off successfully on a 6-day flight. This is the 8th launching in the space shuttle program.

Aug. 31—A communications satellite for the Indian government is successfully launched from the shuttle.

#### UPPER VOLTA

Aug. 5—Captain Thomas Sankara, who was dismissed as Prime Minister in May, seizes power in a coup that overthrows President Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo. Sankara is reportedly aligned with Libya.

#### URUGUAY

Aug. 3—The military government issues a decree that prohibits political parties from pursuing any activity other than internal political activity; the government also rules that it can prohibit any form of political activity by anyone who disturbs the public order.

Aug. 7—The government announces that it arrested 150 people in last night's demonstration against the government.

#### VATICAN (See *Poland*)

#### ZAIRE

Aug. 20—President Mobuto Sese Seko visits President Hissen Habré of Chad in N'Djamena, Chad; Zaire has committed about 2,000 troops to support Habré in his fight against Libyan-backed rebels.

#### ZIMBABWE

Aug. 1—The government orders 3 British journalists to leave the country; they are the 1st newsmen to be expelled under a new decree that prohibits journalists from reporting from Zimbabwe if they are based in South Africa.

Aug. 5—The government makes public regulations on the press that prohibit news coverage of antiterrorist operations.

Aug. 17—After 5 months of self-imposed exile in Britain, opposition leader Joshua Nkomo reclaims his seat in Parliament; Nkomo returned from exile on Aug. 15.

Aug. 31—6 white air force officers are found not guilty of helping to blow up 13 fighter planes in 1982; they are immediately rearrested "as threats to public order." ■



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